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ABSTRACT 
From Francis Marion’s guerrilla war against the British to advising the resistance against 
the Nazis and Japanese, the United States has depended on unconventional warfare (UW) 
as a component of national defense. Today, the U.S. Army Special Forces (SF) is the 
premiere unconventional warfare unit in the U.S. military. With a smaller Army and 
increasing missions, SF must expand its recruiting efforts. This thesis analyzes the 
recruitment and selection process used by other units and finds four traits common to 
successful UW individuals: motivation, interpersonal intelligence, cross-cultural 
capability, and adaptability. SF recruiting is then examined to identify recommendations 
for targeting individuals who possess these traits, two of which are difficult to measure 
during selection—interpersonal intelligence and cross-cultural capability. A demographic 
profile of the Special Forces Regiment emphasizes shortfalls where more targeted 
recruitment may help. Through recruiter reorganization, establishment of a referral 
system, more accurate advertising, adoption of a long-term engagement strategy, and 
renewed leader involvement, SF recruiting can more effectively target those who already 
possess high UW potential. As it is paramount to find the right individuals for UW, 
targeted recruitment will help improve the short and long-term health of the Regiment. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
This thesis argues that actively recruiting talent for Unconventional Warfare 
(UW) will enhance the future effectiveness of the U.S. Army Special Forces Regiment.1 
Recruitment of candidates who already possess traits well-suited for UW will provide the 
raw material to produce more talented UW warriors. Analysis of several former and 
current units with UW missions suggests four different traits common to the most 
talented UW units: motivation, interpersonal intelligence, cross-cultural capability, and 
adaptability. The current selection and assessment process for SF does well at measuring 
motivation and adaptability and ―selects out‖ those found deficient. However, limited 
focus is placed on interpersonal intelligence or cross-cultural capability beyond the 
ability to work together on small teams of similar individuals. Most importantly, if these 
two traits are innate, the candidates without them at the start of training will continue to 
lack them after training is complete.  
SF recruitment faces several challenges today. First, recruitment does not 
specifically focus on the traits common for successful UW. Next, the source population 
for SF recruits—namely soldiers who demonstrate a propensity to join SF—is growing 
smaller and more homogenous; statistical analysis of the current Special Forces Regiment 
proves this fact. Third, two different organizations commanded by the U.S. Army 
Recruiting Command (USAREC) recruit for SF and use a limited number of SF qualified 
recruiters. Fourth, recruitment lacks an effective referral system whereby current SF 
soldiers can refer trusted contacts. Fifth, advertising for SF needs to emphasize working 
by, with, and through indigenous forces. Finally, SF recruitment lacks a long-term 
engagement strategy to inspire the next generation of Green Berets who are today in 
junior high and high school.  
                                                 
1 Unconventional warfare is a subcomponent of irregular warfare and is defined in this thesis as 
―activities conducted to enable a resistance movement or insurgency to coerce, disrupt or overthrow a 
government or occupying power by operating through or with an underground, auxiliary or guerrilla force 
in a denied area.‖ See Mark Grdovic, ―Ramping Up to Face the Challenge of Irregular Warfare‖ Special 
Warfare 22, no. 5 (2009): 16.  
 2 
This thesis does not propose that the current recruitment of SF soldiers is 
ineffective, but rather proposes that actively finding civilians and soldiers with the 
potential to become talented UW soldiers will make the regiment even better. Almost any 
organization, regardless of type, must find the most talented employees to maintain the 
advantage in a competitive environment—and to win. Unconventional warfare is no 
different. Only by finding those who enjoy working closely with indigenous people and 
who understand complex social dynamics will it be possible for SF to maximize its 
effectiveness fully for UW in the future.  
A. THE FIRST GREEN BERETS 
Formed in 1952 to infiltrate Europe and conduct UW after a Soviet invasion, 
many of the first men chosen for SF had previously served with the Office of Strategic 
Services (OSS) in World War II. They were recruited by the OSS because of their 
knowledge of foreign countries, especially in Eastern Europe. Following World War II, 
annual military conscription dropped from 250,000 in 1954 to roughly 80,000 in 1962 
(Figure 1).2 At the same time, the population of men between the ages of 19–25 
potentially eligible for the draft grew from 8 million in 1958 to 12 million in 1964.3 With 
an increasing population but a smaller draft, the proportion of men conscripted fell. The 
broad power of the draft to pull talent from every sector of the American population 
slowly began to diminish. By 1964, almost 30% of men eligible for the draft had received 
occupational, educational, and other draft deferments.4 Consequently, the pool of men 
with unique abilities for SF diminished.  
When the Army became an all-volunteer force in 1973, the collection of those 
who might be interested in SF further diminished. Instead of attracting from among the  
 
 
                                                 
2 Congress of the United States, Congressional Budget Office (CBO), ―The All-Volunteer Military: 
Issues and Performance,‖ (Publication Number 2960: July 2007), 5. 
http://www.cbo.gov/ftpdocs/83xx/doc8313/07-19-MilitaryVol.pdf.  
3 Ibid.  
4 Ibid.  
 3 
wide range of men compelled to join the Army, SF drew from a smaller population of 
mostly combat arms soldiers. This fact would eventually affect the diversity of the 
regiment.  
Today, the 10,052 men who make up the Special Forces Regiment display a 
unique profile when compared to that of the regular Army.5 If SF does not broaden the 
pool from which it recruits exceptional warriors for tomorrow, the regiment will remain a 
homogenous organization, even as it operates with more varied populations. To identify 
demographic shortfalls within the regiment, a statistical analysis was conducted using 
data from January 2011.  
 
 
Figure 1.   Annual number of military draftees and the military’s total accession 
requirement from 1940–1962.6 
B. GREEN BERETS TODAY7 
The following demographic profile compares those currently in the Special Forces 
Regiment with non-SF males in the U.S. Army and National Guard as of January 2011. 
                                                 
5 The total number is a combination of Active Duty (8,425) and National Guard (1,627) SF soldiers 
and was current as of January 2011. 
6 CBO, The All-Volunteer Military: Issues and Performance, 4. Accession was defined as recruits who 
signed contracts and reported to military basic training.  
7 All of the data used for the following demographic analysis comparing the SF and non-SF male 
populations was provided by the Defense Manpower Data Center (DMDC), Seaside, CA in March 2011 
based on data from January 2011. Only males were analyzed because the Special Forces Regiment is an all 
male organization. Detailed statistical analysis can be found in Appendices A and B.  
 4 
Women are not included in this comparison because they are not authorized to serve in 
SF. The Special Forces Regiment data was also analyzed according to Military 
Occupational Specialty (MOS) to identify any unusual trends within SF job specialties.  
1. Age 
War is usually waged by the young, and the U.S. Army consists mainly of a 
young workforce. Most of the active duty Army’s new recruits in fiscal year 2005 were 
between the ages of 18 and 24, with a mean age of 20.8 The average age today for all 
non-SF men in the Army is 29.0, with over 64% of the active duty Army either 30 years 
of age or younger. In contrast, over 61% of the Special Forces Regiment are over 30 
years of age; the average age of an active duty SF soldier is 34.02 years old (statistically 
significant above 26 years old; see Tables 2 and Figure 7 in Appendix A). The results are 
even more striking in the National Guard (Table 11 and Figure 21 in Appendix B). 
Seventy-eight percent of the National Guard SF soldiers are over 30 and 37% are over 40. 
The average age of a National Guard SF solider is 37.9, while the average age of the 
remaining male soldiers in the National Guard is 30.9. These age factors indicate the 
maturity required for unconventional warfare and the need for prior military or life 
experience to aid in combat advisory duties. SF often interacts with populations that place 
great emphasis on age and elders. Thus, an older population of soldiers will likely have 
more success in building rapport. One trend is that Engineer Sergeants (18C) tend to be 
young but Medical Sergeants (18D) tend to be old in both active duty and the National 
Guard. 
2. Rank 
The men of SF are typically more senior in rank at the company and field grade 
levels than those in the rest of the U.S. Army. In fact, the minimum rank authorized for a 
SF operator is Sergeant (E–5). In rare circumstances, a promotable specialist (E–4) may 
spend a short amount of time in a SF assignment, but he is usually promoted to Sergeant 
                                                 
8 Department of Defense, Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness, 
Population Representation in the Military Services: Fiscal Year 2005 (2007), 
www.humrro.org/poprep/poprep05. 
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soon thereafter. Of significance, over 50% of the active duty men in SF are Sergeants 
First Class (E–7)—almost five times the number present in the rest of the Army (all data 
statistically significant; see Table 3 and Figure 8 in Appendix A for active duty and Table 
12 and Figure 22 in Appendix B for National Guard). Indeed, nearly 70% of the non-SF 
population are E–5 or below.  
3. Race and Ethnicity 
It is difficult to attain ethnic and racial diversity for an all-volunteer SOF unit 
inside an all-volunteer military. Moreover, SF should never dictate a quota or lower 
standards merely to achieve diversity.9 Yet, diversity in a unit charged with interacting 
with different cultures and countries is critically important. In addition to meeting general 
recruitment efforts, racial and ethnic diversity within the Special Forces Regiment can 
bring to bear greater cultural and linguistic understanding and influence to both allies and 
adversaries. Also, the ability for nonwhite men to blend into foreign populations may 
help reduce the signature of a SF unit during combat operations.  
The U.S. Army has been at the forefront of diversity since being desegregated by 
Executive Order Number 9981 in 1948.10 Challenges remain. Minorities have historically 
been underrepresented in SF.11 In addition, they are often overrepresented in noncombat 
arms branches of the Army. In contrast, white soldiers are overrepresented in combat 
arms units and have represented a disproportionately larger number of combat fatalities in 
Afghanistan and Iraq.12 This trend likely affects SF because the regiment is 84.5% white, 
                                                 
9 Sheila Nataraj Kirby, Margaret C. Harrell, and Jennifer Sloan, ―Why Don't Minorities Join Special 
Operations Forces?‖ Armed Forces & Society 26, no. 4 (2000): 542–543. The authors’ focus groups of 
minority SOF operators were the most opposed to lowering any standards, since the result would create an 
environment in which ―all minorities would be viewed as substandard and suspect.‖  
10 The Office of Army Demographics (OAD), ―The Changing Profile of the Army: 1985–2008,‖ 2008.  
11 See Harrell, Margaret, Sheila Kirby, Jennifer Sloan, Clifford Graff II, Christopher McKelvey, and 
Jerry Sollinger, Barriers to Minority Participation in Special Operations Forces (Santa Monica, CA: 
RAND, 1999), 21–33. They found in FY1997 that within the eligible populations of potential volunteers, 
which they called source populations (i.e., recruits that met the physical, age, rank, ASVAB score, and 
discipline record standards), minorities were underrepresented in SF compared to their source population 
and the underrepresentation was serious for blacks. Interestingly, they found that SFAS success rates were 
lower for minorities, but the voluntary withdraw rates were also lower than for whites, indicating that once 
at SFAS, the commitment rate among minorities was high.  
12 CBO, ―The All-Volunteer Military: Issues and Performance,‖ 24.  
 6 
compared to 72.2% white for non-SF Army males. Of note, roughly 8% (677 men) of the 
active duty SF population were reported to be ―race unknown‖ and 2.9% (47 men) in the 
National Guard. If nonwhite, these outliers could boost the numbers of minorities within 
Special Forces.  
Blacks represent the largest male racial minority in the Army (18%) but comprise 
a very small portion of the SF population (4.6%). Within all of SF, blacks rose above this 
percentage in only two jobs: Intelligence Sergeant (7.3 %) and Warrant Officer (6.1 %). 
Of the four initial-entry enlisted SF MOSs, blacks were more likely to be Weapons 
Sergeants (5.2% of 18Bs were black) and least likely to be Medical Sergeants (1.9% of 
18Ds were black). Black officers comprise only 3.4% of the SF officer population (all 
data statistically significant; see Table 4 and Figure 10 in Appendix A for active duty and 
Table 13 and Figure 24 in Appendix B for National Guard).  
General recruitment challenges identified within the black community may have 
contributed to this low representation in SF.13 Within the National Guard, blacks 
compose only 2.8% of the SF population, compared with the 11.4% in the male National 
Guard population overall. In National Guard SF units, blacks were more likely to be 
Warrant Officers (5.6% of 180As were black) or Communication Sergeants (5.2% of 
18Es were blacks), but were least likely to be SF officers (1.2% of 18As were black) or 
Medical Sergeants (1.3% of 18Ds were black). Only three black SF officers and three 
black Medical Sergeants serve throughout the National Guard SF.  
The variance between SF and the Army overall was less dramatic for Asians who 
comprise approximately 3.7% of the active duty male Army population (see Figure 11 in 
Appendix A for active duty and Figure 25 in Appendix B for National Guard). Their 
representation within SF is 2.1 percent. Within the active duty SF, Asians were least 
likely to be Warrant Officers (0.6%) or Engineer Sergeants (1.2%). Asians composed 
                                                 
13 See the Office of Army Demographics (OAD), ―FY2009 Army Profile,‖ September 30, 2009, 7. 
Since 9/11, the number of blacks who had indicated they would likely join the Army declined from 11% in 
2001 to 8% in 2008. In addition, surveyed black youth indicated that people they viewed as ―influencers‖ in 
their decision to join (parents, grandparents, etc.) were less likely to recommend the Army as a career than 
they were in the past. Surveys from the Joint Advertising, Market Research and Studies (JAMRS) also 
indicated that the decrease from ―influencers‖ was related to attitudes about the role of the Army in war and 
the likelihood of casualties on the battlefield. 
 7 
approximately 2.7% of SF officers on Active Duty. Within the National Guard, numbers 
were lower and not statistically significant. Asians comprise 1.8% of the SF population 
compared to 2.2% in the National Guard as a whole. They are significantly 
underrepresented as SF officers, Warrant Officers, and Intelligence Sergeants (with only 
one in each MOS), but can be said to be ―overrepresented‖ as Communication Sergeants 
(2.8%).  
American Indians and Native Alaskans are relatively few in number in SF and 
comprise only 0.81% of the total active duty SF population (68 men). This is nearly 
identical to their overall representation within the active duty Army at 0.82% and results 
were not statistically significant (see Figure 12 in Appendix A for active duty and Figure 
26 in Appendix B for National Guard). American Indians and Native Alaskans were 
scarcest as SF Officers and Weapons Sergeants, with only 0.48% (8 men) listed as 18As 
and 1.1% (14 men) as 18Bs. Within the National Guard, only six American Indians or 
Native Alaskans serve, with none serving as Warrant Officers, Weapons Sergeants, 
Medical Sergeants, or Intelligence Sergeants.  
Hispanics comprise 7.2% of the SF population, compared to 11.2% for the rest of 
the active duty Army (see Table 5 and Figure 13 in Appendix A). Within active duty SF, 
more Hispanics were Intelligence Sergeants (12.2% of 18Fs were Hispanic) or Weapons 
Sergeants (10.2% of 18Bs were Hispanic), while comparatively few were SF officers 
(4.1% of 18As were Hispanic) or senior Non-Commissioned Officers (5.8% of 18Zs were 
Hispanic). Within the National Guard, Hispanics make up approximately 2–3% of most 
of the SF MOSs, with the exception of senior Non-Commissioned Officers (4.5% of 18Zs 
were Hispanic) and officers again (1.9% of 18As were Hispanic) (see Table 14 and 
Figure 27 in Appendix B). Outside of the senior Non-Commissioned Officer ranks in the 
National Guard, Hispanics are severely underrepresented as officers and senior NCOs in 
the Special Forces Regiment. This trend may be worthy of concern since these two MOSs 





is the largest minority within the United States and is projected to grow in the next 
decade. Thus, the underrepresentation of Hispanics in the leadership of SF may 
unnecessarily impact SF’s ability to wield influence in South America.14 
4. Education 
SF soldiers must endure an extremely long training cycle before they become 
qualified Green Berets; in some cases, training lasts up to two years. Therefore, it is not 
surprising that they have a more robust educational profile than is found in the rest of the 
Army (See Table 6 and Figure 14 in Appendix A). The Special Forces Regiment has 
nearly double the rate of earned bachelor’s degrees than the rest of the Army (33% to 
18%, respectively). Although the overall education level was generally higher for active 
duty SF when compared to the active duty Army, percentages of officers with master’s 
degrees was significantly higher (35% compared to 6%). However, SF has three times 
fewer PhDs, (0.06% compared with 0.19% within the active duty Army). Of the four 
initial-entry enlisted Special Forces MOSs, Medical Sergeants ranked highest for 
bachelor’s degrees (17.6%) while Weapons Sergeant ranked the lowest (6.6%).  
The educational profile for the National Guard Special Forces is even more 
impressive, with more than double the overall rate for bachelor’s degrees, 35% versus 
15% (See Table 15 and Figure 28 in Appendix B). Of note, senior Non-Commissioned 
Officers in the National Guard SF have almost twice the rate of master’s degrees earned 
compared to the rest of the National Guard (4.5% versus 2.4%). In addition, the ratio of 
PhDs within the National Guard SF (0.5%) was actually higher than that in the rest of the 
National Guard (0.3%).  
5. Family 
Since SF soldiers are usually older and more senior ranking, they are more likely 
to be married with more dependents than other soldiers (see Tables 7–8 and Figures 15–
18 in Appendix A for active duty and Tables 16–17 and Figures 29–32 in Appendix B for 
National Guard). Nearly three out of every four active duty SF soldiers are married, 
                                                 
14 The Office of Army Demographics (OAD), ―FY2009 Army Profile,‖ September 30, 2009, 9.  
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compared to just 60.3% for the rest of the Army. In addition, only 19.9% of the active 
duty SF has never been married compared to 35% in the rest of the Army. The Special 
Forces Regiment is often cited as having a much higher divorce rate than the Army 
overall. While the rate is statistically higher, it is not considerably higher than the non-SF 
Army population (6.1% versus 4.5%).15 SF soldiers have statistically significant greater 
numbers of dependents when compared to non-SF Active–Duty or the National Guard 
soldiers.16 
6. Country of Birth 
The 10th Special Forces Group (Airborne), SF’s first unit, was comprised of both 
U.S. citizens and Eastern European refugees. The Lodge Act, passed in 1950, authorized 
2,500 Eastern European migrants to serve in the U.S. military and earn their citizenship 
after five years of successful military service.17 In exchange, these refugees would 
provide ―language capability, area knowledge, and cultural expertise‖ to aid the SF in 
unconventional warfare operations against the Soviets throughout Europe.18 Although 
this U.S. ―foreign legion‖ was never fully utilized as a behind-the-lines force in Europe, a 
similarly recruited force of first and second-generation Americans could provide SF with 
an equally relevant force for the environment today. However, such a U.S. foreign legion 
would require recruiting from different from sources today.19  
                                                 
15 This data only represents the current marriage status and does not take into account previous 
marriages. Therefore, the analysis was unable to determine the total number of divorces per soldier. The 
divorce rate was statistically significant and higher at a sensitivity level, α, of 0.01 for both active duty and 
National Guard.  
16 Data analyzed was the number of dependents for SF and non-SF populations on active duty and in 
the National Guard (1, 2, 3, 4, or 5+ dependents). SF showed statistically greater numbers of two, three, and 
four dependents at a sensitivity level of 0.01; see Appendices A and B.  
17 Trevor O. Robichaux, ―Special Forces Recruiting: The Operational Need for Targeted Recruitment 
of First and Second Generation Americans‖ (Master’s thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, December 2008), 
16–18.  
18 Ian D. Sutherland, Special Forces of the United States Army (San Jose, CA: R. James Bender 
Publishing, 1990), 25.  
19 For a detailed analysis of the benefits that first and second generation Americans may be able to 
provide to SF, see Trevor O. Robichaux, ―Special Forces Recruiting: The Operational Need for Targeted 
Recruitment of First and Second Generation Americans‖ (Master’s thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, 
December 2008).  
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Only 4.6% of SF soldiers were born in a foreign country. In contrast, the non-SF 
active duty Army has 5.2% of its male soldiers who were foreign born. While birth 
outside of the United States does not guarantee an individual will better understand the 
culture and language of his native country, an increased likelihood exists that an 
individual will at least be more familiar with some of its customs. Both SF and non-SF 
personnel are more likely to have been born in Germany, Puerto Rico, and the Republic 
of Korea than anywhere else outside of the United States. However, many foreign-born 
non-SF personnel are also from Mexico and the Philippines. In both SF and non-SF 
populations, African and South American countries are notably underrepresented (See 
Table 9 and Figure 19 in Appendix A).  
7. U.S. Regional Distribution 
One concern with analyzing where Army personnel come from in the United 
States is the fact that many men have become state residents based on their previous or 
current Army assignments. They do not necessarily remain residents of the state of their 
youth. In addition, soldiers find states with no state income tax to be extremely attractive, 
even though the state may have had little or no effect on their upbringing. Still, nearly 
two-thirds of all active duty SF soldiers claim residency in the Southwest and Southeast, 
which is nearly double the rate for the rest of the Army.  
The South has historically been a strong recruiting base for the Army, even 
though the qualification rates for recruits from other regions is higher.20 Promilitary 
sentiment is often strong in the South, in addition to the fact that most bases are located 
there.21 Thus, even if the data for SF is biased because of the locations of Fort Bragg 
(NC), Fort Campbell (KY), Fort Carson (CO), Fort Lewis (WA), and Eglin AFB (FL), 
half of the male Army population from which SF will recruit is located in the Southwest 
and Southeast. The Northeast and West are particularly underrepresented among active 
duty SF personnel (see Table 10 and Figure 20 in Appendix A). In contrast, the two 
                                                 
20 Mark Eitelberg, Janice Laurence, Brian Waters, and Linda Perelmen, Screening for Service: 
Aptitude and Education Criteria for Military Entry (Washington, DC: Human Resources Research 
Organization, 1984), 83. 
21 Eitelberg et al., Screening for Service: Aptitude and Education Criteria for Military Entry, 83. 
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National Guard SF groups, which are more evenly dispersed throughout the United 
States, have a more diverse regional distribution (see Table 18 and Figure 33 in Appendix 
B).  
8. Demographic Summary 
The Special Forces Regiment comprises only 1.49% of the entire active duty 
Army and only 0.44% of the National Guard. It is an older force, more senior in rank, and 
more educated than the rest of the Army or National Guard. Active duty SF soldiers 
average 34 years of age while National Guard SF soldiers average 38 years of age. As 
expected, the regiment has men of higher rank (70% of active duty are E–7 or higher with 
66% for the National Guard). One third of all SF soldiers have already earned a 
bachelor’s degree, while over one third of SF officers have a master’s degree. National 
Guard SF soldiers have twice the rate of master’s degrees and PhDs as the rest of the 
National Guard. Roughly three quarters of the men in SF are currently married (13% 
more than in the rest of the active duty Army) with more dependents, while the number 
of men currently divorced is only marginally higher in SF (~2%). Most of the men within 
SF are state residents of the Southeast and Southwest. Although this residency may not 
reflect where they were raised, a historic dearth of soldiers come from the Northeast and 
West within SF.  
Of note, racial and ethnic minorities are almost universally underrepresented 
within SF when compared to the potential applicant pool of males within the Army and 
National Guard overall; this fact is especially true for blacks (comparisons are nearly all 
statistically significant at sensitivity level of 0.01 in Appendices A and B). Surveying 
how many foreign-born soldiers serve in active duty SF units clearly points to a missed 
recruiting opportunity. While the Special Forces Regiment was originally formed using 
non-citizen refugees in the 1950s, today’s regiment has very few first-generation 
Americans (<5%). Of those foreign born, most were born in countries with a U.S. 
military garrison: Germany, Korea, and Puerto Rico. Notably, active duty SF has almost  
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no foreign-born men from either Africa or South America.22 By targeting recruitment 
efforts towards these populations, possibly through engagement with diasporas or 
academia, SF could bring more culturally capable individuals to the regiment.  
                                                 
22 Data were not available on foreign-born SF soldiers within the National Guard.  
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II. UNCONVENTIONAL WARRIORS (PAST AND PRESENT) 
From the beginning, Irregular Warfare (IW) has been an important component to 
U.S. national defense.23 During the Revolutionary War, Nathanael Greene’s militia bled 
the British Army as the Redcoats gave chase across North Carolina, while the ―Swamp 
Fox‖ Francis Marion launched guerrilla attacks on key British supply lines in South 
Carolina.24 Over 150 years later, fewer than 300 men of the U.S. Office of Strategic 
Services (OSS) led an unconventional war against the Nazis to pave the way for the 
Normandy invasion. At that same time in China, U.S. advisors and their local guerrillas 
killed 27,000 and wounded 11,000 Japanese soldiers without losing a single U.S. soldier 
to enemy fire.25 These soldiers are the bookends of U.S. irregular warfare that laid the 
groundwork for the U.S. Army SF’s more recent UW campaign that toppled 
Afghanistan’s Taliban regime in 2001. Among the constants has been the strategic effect 
that a small group of soldiers can have on the IW battlefield.  
Success in unconventional warfare is different from success in conventional war. 
Victory is not measured by the number of soldiers or the destructiveness of weapon 
systems deployed, but depends on the wits of those fighting. Even as technology, 
                                                 
23 Irregular Warfare is ―a violent struggle among state and nonstate actors for legitimacy and influence 
over the relevant population(s). IW favors indirect and asymmetric approaches, though it may employ the 
full range of military and other capacities in order to erode an adversary’s power, influence and will.‖ Also, 
five subordinate categories comprise IW: counterinsurgency (COIN); counterterrorism (CT); foreign 
internal defense (FID); stability operations (SO); and unconventional warfare (UW). This thesis focuses on 
the UW component of irregular warfare; see Mark Grdovic ―Ramping Up to Face the Challenge of 
Irregular Warfare‖ Special Warfare 22, no. 5 (2009): 15–16.  
24 Greene never actually defeated British General Cornwallis’ force of approximately 1,900 Redcoats, 
but Greene’s militia killed or wounded almost a quarter of Cornwallis’ men, while the harsh North Carolina 
winter claimed over 400 British soldiers to sickness; see Gregory J. W. Urwin, ―When Freedom Wore a 
Red Coat: How Cornwallis’ 1781 Virginia Campaign Threatened the Revolution in Virginia,‖ in The U.S. 
Army and Irregular Warfare, 1775–2007: Selected Papers from the 2007 Conference of Army Historians, 
ed. Richard G. Davis (Washington, DC: Center of Military History, 2008), 63. For the ―Swamp Fox‖ 
Francis Marion, see Steven J. Rauch, ―Southern (Dis)Comfort: British Phase IV Operations in South 
Carolina and Georgia, May–September 1780,‖ in The U.S. Army and Irregular Warfare, 1775–2007: 
Selected Papers from the 2007 Conference of Army Historians, ed. Richard G. Davis (Washington, DC: 
Center of Military History, 2008), 47.  
25 For OSS operations as Jedburgh teams see S. J. Lewis, Jedburgh Team Operations in Support of the 
12th Army Group, August 1944 (Fort Leavenworth, KS: U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, 
1991), 6; Dick Camp provided an estimate of the success of SACO from its leadership and can be found at 
Dick Camp, ―SACO-American and Chinese Guerrillas in World War II,‖ Leatherneck 86, no. 7 (2003): 43.  
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globalization, and urbanization change the character of war, unconventional warfare 
requires finding men capable of long-term, independent, small team efforts to advise and 
influence foreign forces to defeat a larger and more powerful enemy. These men must be 
able to operate with little guidance in austere environments.  
Predicting human behavior is an inexact science; attempting to quantify who will 
become an excellent unconventional warrior is extremely challenging. Even if one is 
gifted with extraordinary tactical competence, interpersonal intelligence, and cross-
cultural capability, lacking physical toughness or being unable to stay motivated could 
lead to failure. Much of U.S. current understanding about modern personnel assessment 
and selection began with work by German military psychologists on their officer 
selection in the 1920s. Others added much in their wake. What follows is a summation of 
the recruitment and selection efforts utilized for various UW and UW-like organizations, 
including the OSS, SACO, the Coastwatchers, SAS, the U.S. Navy SEALs, and Delta 
Force.  
A. THE OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES (OSS)26 
Established to provide psychological warfare, sabotage, and subversion 
capabilities, the OSS borrowed certain elements from two existing British organizations, 
the Special Operations Executive (SOE) and the Psychological Warfare Executive 
(PWE). In an effort to coordinate the varied intelligence activities of the U.S. 
Government in 1941, Colonel William Donovan was selected by President Franklin D. 
Roosevelt (FDR) to become the Coordinator of Information (COI) five months before the 
bombing of Pearl Harbor. Donovan, ―a World War I hero and a Wall Street lawyer with 
extensive contacts on both sides of the Atlantic and a keen interest in modern warfare,‖ 
                                                 
26 Many sources for information concerning the OSS exists. For this section, information was obtained 
from the following sources: Edward Hymoff, The OSS in World War II (New York: Ballantine Books, Inc., 
1972), 40, 70–71, 77, 82; H. L. Ansbacher, ―Lasting and Passing Aspects of German Military Psychology.‖ 
Sociometry 12, no. 4 (1949): 301–303; John W. Chambers, ―Office of Strategic Services Training During 
World War II.‖ Studies in Intelligence 54, no. 2 (2010): 2, 9–11; Sally Kuhlenschmidt, ―OSS Assessment,‖ 
April 7, 2003, http://people.wku.edu/sally.kuhlenschmidt/whimsy/oss/oss.htm; Lewis, Jedburgh Team 
Operations in Support of the 12th Army Group, August 1944, 7–8; Donald Mackinnon, ―How Assessment 
Centers Were Started in the United States: The OSS Assessment Program.‖ Studies in Intelligence 23, no. 3 
(1979): 21–34; United States Office of Strategic Services, Assessment of Men: Selection of Personnel for 
the Office of Strategic Services (New York: Rinehart and Company, Inc., 1958), 4, 30–32, 58–60, 94–146. 
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quickly became the charismatic leader of COI.27 In October 1941, FDR authorized 
Donovan to recruit and train spies, saboteurs, and guerrilla leaders for use against future 
enemies. As the Allies prepared for operations in North Africa and their landing in Nazi-
occupied Europe, the COI began to establish and develop its intelligence networks 
worldwide. In the summer of 1942, FDR renamed the COI the OSS and gave it sole 
responsibility for all covert activities.  
Donovan developed two types of covert irregular warfare elements for the OSS, 
the Special Operations (SO) teams and Operational Group (OG) units. SO teams worked 
as two or three-man teams, and were designed to focus on sabotage and subversion. In 
contrast, OG units were organized as 34-man sections or 15-man half sections (two 
officers and 13 NCOs), and were intended to be ―capable of longer and more sustained 
independent actions.‖28 The SO teams were assembled after training, whereas the OGs 
trained as complete units. In reality, both SOs and OGs operated in a very similar 
manner; that is, fighting alongside resistance groups to conduct subversion, sabotage, and 
guerrilla warfare. 
Most Americans who volunteered for the hazardous missions of the SO or OG 
were citizen soldiers from the wartime military. Most had already completed basic 
military training, and many also had advanced training. The challenge for the OSS was 
with career soldiers. Many military career officers who joined the OSS were too set in 
their ways for the dynamic environment of a cutting-edge organization. Fortunately, 
Donovan recognized the need for audacious, rule-breaking individuals. After a significant 
number of law enforcement and career military members left the OSS, the OSS began to 
rely more on citizen soldiers rather than ―already established, fulltime, career 
professionals in the officer corps.‖29  
Donovan’s initial recruiting efforts included finding ―administrators from the 
private sector who had made their mark in their respective professions.‖30 This method 
                                                 
27 Chambers, ―Office of Strategic Services Training During World War II,‖ 2. 
28 Ibid., 9–10. 
29 Ibid., 11. 
30 Hymoff, The OSS in World War II, 77.  
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led to renowned economists, lawyers, politicians, movie stars, athletes, royalty, and even 
Nobel Laureates joining the OSS. The OSS sought out those Americans with knowledge 
or expertise in specific areas, such as academia, science, politics, or industry. Initially, the 
OSS targeted potential administrators who could be trusted to keep secret the U.S. 
financial support of resistance movements worldwide; however, in late 1942, more 
personnel were recruited for activities behind enemy lines than for administrative 
positions. Consequently, the need for smart Americans who understood foreign languages 
grew. Often, the best place to find such individuals was in the upper socio-economic 
brackets; especially suitable were highly educated professionals who could afford to 
travel in contrast to the nearly 60 percent of the American population who had only an 
elementary school education.31  
Recruiting for the OSS occurred through three channels: the Personnel 
Procurement Branch (PPB), the Civilian Personnel Branch (CPB), and internal OSS 
individual recruitment. The PPB recruited exclusively from the military. Screening out 
misfits took time, especially with ―psychopaths who have a special talent to make a good 
impression over brief periods of time.‖32 Unfortunately, each recruiter in the PPB had his 
own idea of what OSS operations required. Therefore, many recruiters held conflicting 
notions about whom to recruit as their ideal applicants. Thus, recruiters were forced to 
attend one day of assessment to observe one another. At the same time, simple 
organizational frictions worked against the PPB recruiters; some requests for transfers 
were blocked by the normal military bureaucratic red tape.  
                                                 
31 Hymoff, The OSS in World War II, 82. However, the late evolutionary biologist Stephen Gould 
countered this claim; he described Colonel Robert Yerkes who attempted to validate psychology during 
World War I by testing the intelligence of 1.75 million Army recruits. Yates oversaw the development of 
the Army Alpha test for literate recruits and the Army Beta test, which was designed for illiterates who 
failed the Alpha test. A graduated grading scale (from A to E) offered suggestions for appropriate job 
placement within the Army. The results were largely ignored except in officer selection, where numbers 
swelled from 9,000 to 200,000. When Yerkes’ ―mass-produced written tests of intelligence…the era of 
mass testing had begun.‖ After detailed analysis of 160,000 cases from the Army, Yerkes’s staff concluded 
that the average mental age of white American adults was thirteen. Yet, his testing method was highly 
questionable. His tests measured familiarity with American culture, not a true measure of intelligence for a 
recent immigrant. For an excellent argument against the innate IQ testing of the early 1900s and the result 
of environmental factors on human flexibility, see Stephen J. Gould, The Mismeasure of Man (New York: 
W.W. Norton & Company, Inc., 1981). 
32 Mackinnon, ―How Assessment Centers Were Started in the United States: OSS Assessment 
Program,‖ 25.  
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The CPB recruited mostly civilian men and women to serve as secretaries and 
stenographers. Not surprisingly, most of these were women. The CPB generally used 
―vaguely worded newspaper and magazine advertising‖ to find applicants.33 In addition 
to the CPB, OSS members routinely recommended friends, family, and acquaintances for 
job openings. This internal recruitment was only effective, however, if the OSS member 
was a good judge of personality and character; often, this process was plagued by 
personal favoritism and did not result in what was best for the OSS.  
Essentially, this method of recruiting was like fishing with a large net, resulting in 
a lot of bycatch. Communists, Socialists, and Marxists all made their way into the OSS, 
along with many first-generation American artists, mechanics, and former law 
enforcement officers looking for adventure. Well-educated individuals who appeared 
suitable for OSS operations, but lacked the ability to deal with uncertainty, began to find 
their way into the field as well. Taken from their civilian lives, these members were often 
given expedited training and learned the rules of covert operations extemporaneously. 
Reports of agent incompetence and mental breakdowns increased.  
In September 1943, the OSS needed to build its SO teams (aka Jedburgh) for 
infiltration into Nazi-occupied France. The OSS, in coordination with the British SOE, 
developed training grounds in Great Britain and recruited 55 suitable officer volunteers to 
command the Jedburgh teams; only 35 completed the training.34 Their recruitment was 
guided by the following selection criteria:  
Officers should be picked for qualities of leadership and daring, ability to 
speak and understand French, and all-around physical condition. They 
should be experienced in handling men, preferably in an active theater of 
operations, and be prepared to be parachuted in uniform behind enemy 
lines and operate on their own for some time. They must have at least 
basic military training and preferably have aptitude for small arms 
weapons.35  
                                                 
33 Office of Strategic Services, Assessment of Men, 60.  
34 Lewis, Jedburgh Team Operations in Support of the 12th Army Group, August 1944, 7. 
35 Ibid., 7–8. 
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Even with such significant operational requirements, by late 1943, the OSS was 
still not using any professional or uniform screening process for OSS recruits. It 
developed elaborate training facilities, both in the United States and overseas, but 
individuals still completed the training only to fail overseas—often resulting in death. 
This scenario changed only after an OSS official in Britain visited a British War Office 
Selection Board (WOSB) where potential officer candidates were tested for the British 
Army. The WOSB staff of psychiatrists and psychologists lived together with the 
candidates in an attempt to predict their behavior. The British WOSB selection process 
was based on work previously done by German military psychologists.  
As early as 1918, the German military recognized the importance of officer 
personality and developed a ―large-scale selection method for officer candidates.‖36 The 
scientific director of German psychology, Dr. Max Simoneit, required high technical and 
personality ratings for all officer applicants. German military psychology concluded that 
personality had to be studied as a whole, which produced a unique selection procedure. 
Thorough personal background information obtained by observation and interaction with 
candidates, often in various group situations, was combined with results from numerous 
tests. The candidates were observed by several different evaluators over two to three 
days, and lived at the testing location during their assessment. In addition, the assessment 
was conducted ―in a friendly atmosphere which facilitated spontaneous behavior and 
human interaction.‖37 Lessons from the German and British selection procedures 
eventually produced the seminal OSS psychological assessment program.  
The OSS was reorganized into nine different branches in January 1943, and the 
Schools and Training (S&T) Branch was given responsibility for assessing and training 
recruits. S&T organized a psychological-psychiatric assessment unit in November 1943, 
located at Station S, a country estate in Fairfax County, Virginia.38 There, candidates 
were assessed during 3½ days of testing to determine ―not only their mental and physical 
                                                 
36 H. L. Ansbacher, ―Lasting and Passing Aspects of German Military Psychology,‖ Sociometry 12, 
no. 4 (1949): 301.  
37 Ibid., 303. 
38 Chambers, ―Office of Strategic Services Training During World War II,‖ 11. 
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aptitude but their judgment, independence, emotional stability, and ability to act 
effectively under pressure.‖39 The staff developed nine dimensions of assessment: 
motivation, practical intelligence, emotional stability, social relations, leadership, 
physical ability, observation and reporting, propaganda skills, and maintaining cover. 
Other dimensions sometimes used were recruiting or teaching ability. Each dimension 
was rated using a six-point Likert scale: very inferior, inferior, low average, high average, 
superior, and very superior.40  
Candidates recruited for selection shared some general characteristics. Most were 
of above-average intelligence, and half had visited foreign countries. One in five had 
traveled to Europe, one in 20 had visited Africa or Asia, and one in 10 had traveled to 
Latin America. In addition, one in eight had been to two or more continents, and one-fifth 
had spent five or more years overseas. Many were foreign born or were political refugees. 
One quarter spoke a foreign language fluently, and one in 12 spoke two or more 
languages. Compartmentalization by the assessment staff meant that if recruits were 
weeded out, they would know little about OSS methods.41  
The recruits (both men and women) were formed into classes of roughly 18 
candidates at Station S and were instructed never to reveal their real identities while 
there. Psychological tests, similar to those used today, helped build a detailed personal 
history and personality description. Candidates were often divided into subgroups for 
purposes of assessment: saboteurs (generally more athletic), spies (generally more 
educated, less athletic), and potential propagandists (generally immigrants and more 
artistic).42 The assessment team observed each candidate through various tasks and tests. 
For example, the Brook Situation required a group of candidates to cross a stream 
(simulated canyon) carrying a log (simulated important piece of equipment) and return 
with a rock (simulated explosives); all members were required to do so within a specified 
                                                 
39 Chambers, ―Office of Strategic Services Training During World War II,‖ 11. 
40 Office of Strategic Services, Assessment of Men, 32.  
41 Hymoff, The OSS in World War II, 82.  
42 Sally Kuhlenschmidt, ―OSS Assessment,‖ April 7, 2003, 
http://people.wku.edu/sally.kuhlenschmidt/whimsy/oss/oss.htm.  
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amount of time without designating a leader. The Wall Situation challenged the same 
group to cross over a high wall with similar restrictions. The Construction Situation 
required candidates to direct two assistants in the construction of a simple wooden 
structure within 10 minutes, but in this case, the role-playing assistants would remain 
disobedient. Another test was the Stress Interview. Candidates were given a short amount 
of time in which to develop a cover story for why they had been found going through 
secret papers in a government office building.43  
Numerous other tests were administered, and each had a different aim. For 
instance, some tests included the OWI test (for cultural-sensitivity), map memory test 
(observe and report), mechanical comprehension test (intelligence), Manchuria test 
(propaganda), discussion (verbal resourcefulness), and teaching tests.44 The most 
important hurdle for every candidate during assessment was the clinical interview by a 
psychologist; this interview weighed more heavily in the candidate’s final personality 
rating than did anything else. Even the graduation party, at which alcohol was served, 
involved the assessment team’s efforts to expose a candidate’s cover story.45 Essentially, 
Station S can considered one giant simulation, with each candidate having the task of 
consistently acting as a person he or she was not. In the end, the assessment of each 
candidate at Station S was not based on any possessed specific skills for a particular job, 
but rather on the whole man or woman and their strengths and weaknesses in general 
situations. Station S began assessing in December 1943 and screened 5,391 recruits by 
August 1945.46  
Due to the OSS’s heavy manpower requirement, Station S and its 3½-day 
program could not assess all the recruits needed for OSS operations worldwide. Thus, in 
March 1944, a one-day assessment center, Station W, was established near Washington 
to assess candidates destined for headquarters or rear bases assignments, rather than field 
operations. Two months later, Station WS was established in Laguna Beach, California, 
                                                 
43 Kuhlenschmidt, ―OSS Assessment,‖ April 7, 2003. 
44 Office of Strategic Services, Assessment of Men, 94–146.  
45 Kuhlenschmidt, ―OSS Assessment,‖ April 7, 2003. 
46 Hymoff, The OSS in World War II, 82.  
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to assess applicants recruited in the West.47 Over time, the OSS’s evaluation teams 
learned that what made OSS members most effective as saboteurs in France, spies in 
Germany, commandos in Burma, or clandestine radio-operators in China, was ―a secure, 
capable, intelligent and creative person who could deal effectively with uncertainty and 
considerable stress.‖48  
Since the OSS asked much of its operators, trying to find the right person for each 
mission was an extremely challenging task. The difficulty in predicting human behavior 
in combat environments under time-constrained assessment periods cannot be overstated. 
Yet, the OSS successfully conducted many strategic operations under complex and 
dangerous conditions that greatly aided in the defeat of both Germany and Japan. Worth 
noting is that even though the screening process implemented by the OSS Assessment 
Staff for recruiting and selecting the best OSS agents was critical to the OSS helping to 
win WWII, the staff still concluded its ability to predict overseas performance was 
limited.49  
B. SINO-AMERICAN COOPERATIVE ORGANIZATION (SACO) 
The state of U.S. influence in the Pacific was at a low point after Pearl Harbor. 
The Pacific fleet was destroyed and Japan had greatly expanded its Greater East Asia Co-
Prosperity Sphere.50 With most U.S. military resources destined for Europe by early 
1942, the War Department pursued alternative means to fight the Japanese.51 The Navy, 
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for instance, developed a plan to build a unit that would fight an unconventional war 
against the Japanese using guerrilla warfare, sabotage, and subversion.52 Initially a one-
man mission, this irregular force eventually grew to over nearly 3,000 U.S. advisors, 
97,000 Chinese guerrillas, and 20,000 Chinese pirates and saboteurs.53 By mid-1943, 
Captain Milton Miles’ Sino-American Cooperative Organization (SACO) was entrenched 
throughout China with weather stations, lookout posts, and guerrilla bases. These 
facilities yielded an elaborate intelligence network that reported weather conditions to 
Allied forces and disrupted Japanese operations via guerrilla warfare. In little more than a 
year of combat operations, the Chinese guerrillas and their U.S. advisors would engage 
the Japanese forces more than 1,000 times. Their results were incredible—27,000 
Japanese soldiers killed, 11,000 wounded, and 500 captured without one U.S. serviceman 
killed by enemy fire.54 The results made SACO guerrillas the most efficient force in the 
Far East. More Japanese were killed and more Japanese material destroyed with a smaller 
loss of men than any other unit in the entire China-Burma-India Theater.55  
As the U.S. Navy began to formulate its long-term plan to defeat the Japanese via 
China, the first directive was to disrupt Japanese shipping by mining the Chinese coast, 
inland waterways, and harbors of Formosa. In addition, the plan called for gaining 
intelligence and disrupting Japanese forces in preparation for an American invasion. Most 
importantly, the Navy needed accurate weather reports to allow the U.S. Pacific Fleet to 
forecast air and sea operations east of China. Naval Captain Milton E. Miles was also 
tasked to survey the Chinese coast to identify potential landing beaches and test new anti-
ship mines.56 Admiral King personally asked Miles to: 
 
                                                 
52 Roy O. Stratton, SACO: The Rice Paddy Navy (Pleasantville, NY: C. S. Palmer Publishing Co., 
1950), 1. 
53 U.S. China Group Naval Veterans, ―SACO Sino-American Cooperative Organization,‖ January 30, 
2011, http://saconavy.com/history.htm.  
54 Dick Camp, ―SACO-American and Chinese Guerrillas in World War II,‖ Leatherneck 86, no. 7 
(2003): 43.  
55 Fitzgerald, ―Naval Group China: A Study of Guerrilla Warfare During World War II,‖ 112.  
56 Ibid., iii. 
 23 
[F]ind out what is going on out there … we are going to have tough 
sledding out there … You are to go to China and set up some bases as 
soon as you can. The main idea is to prepare the China coast in any way 
you can for U.S. Navy landings in three or four years. In the meantime, do 
whatever you can to help the Navy and heckle the Japanese.57  
Miles’ own interest in the Orient began during his first naval assignment in Asia; 
one lesson he learned from his commanders was that no place was unimportant. He spent 
time traveling inland to learn about the culture and local customs in Java, Bali, Malaya, 
Indochina, China, Japan, and the Philippines. While recruiting men to serve in SACO, 
Captain Miles set as a standard that any potential recruit ―must be prepared to work 
without friction with anyone.‖58 Miles highlighted cooperation and rapport above all else, 
which is the reason why he prevented former China hands from joining; men who had 
formerly lived in China had a propensity to dominate the Chinese people rather than 
cooperate with them. All SACO volunteers had to be new to China. SACO recruited 
mostly from the naval reserves and screened for political prejudices: ―respect for China's 
100% sovereignty ... was one of the cardinal points in the system established by Miles for 
selecting his subordinates in the new organization.‖59 Specialists of all kinds were 
recruited for SACO to include:  
[A]erologists, radio technicians, amphibious and demolitions experts, dog 
and pigeon trainers, lawyers, doctors, dentists, chaplains, cavalrymen, air 
combat intelligence personnel, research men and every other highly skilled 
personnel that would help the Navy … the men came from ships at sea, 
foreign and continental naval stations, and from every walk of life. Most 
were reservists, only a few from the regular armed services.60 
In addition, each man had to possess a minimum of two unique skills and one 
useful hobby … ―even medical personnel had to be photographers, weather men, or 
chaplains.‖61 Living conditions were difficult and volunteers were screened carefully. 
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Volunteers needed to possess ―good health and rugged constitutions, particularly a good 
heart and digestive system.‖62 These criteria required an American who was part 
marauder and part quartermaster, one who could live off the land in the winter and 
summer by using the materials at hand.63 A member had to be physically rugged enough 
to walk 20 miles or more a day for an indefinite period.64 A volunteer’s attention to duty 
had to be unquestioning, and he had to possess the willingness to take chances. In 
addition, a member of SACO had to be able to ―place complete confidence in the Chinese 
guerrilla.‖65 Miles recollected the type of man he needed: 
We want sturdy individuals, but all a little crazy. But they should be only 
slightly crazy-not as much as I am in order to preserve for the skipper the 
traditional rank has its privileges. Volunteers must be prepared to eat and 
live Chinese style, and expect nothing else. They must renounce drinking, 
as this is too dangerous a job to endeavor by dissipation. The men who 
come out here better be prepared for a country life among the birds and 
trees. They had better be pipe smokers and tea drinkers. So far we have 
neither cigarettes nor coffee.66  
SACO would eventually include 2,964 American servicemen from the Navy, 
Army, and Marines, 97,000 Chinese guerrillas, and roughly 20,000 ―individualists,‖ such 
as pirates and lone-wolf saboteurs. Aided by the Chinese government, SACO supplied 
the Pacific Fleet with regular weather reports from many occupied areas in the Far East. 
The group successfully rescued 76 downed aviators. Again, 71,000 Japanese were killed 
as the result of actions by and information from SACO.67  
C. THE COASTWATCHERS 
The Coastwatchers served as the early warning system for the resource-
constrained Allies in the Pacific and greatly aided the defeat of the Japanese in the 
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Solomon Islands.68 In fact, Admiral Halsey famously said, ―the Coastwatchers saved 
Guadalcanal and Guadalcanal saved the South Pacific.‖69 Developed by the Royal 
Australian Navy after WWI, the Island Coastwatching Service comprised a network of 
observers who guarded the vast coastline of Australia in case of war.70 All Coastwatchers 
were volunteers, and were often local government officials, merchants, and 
missionaries.71 They watched the strategic islands to Australia’s northeast and used 
―teleradios‖ to report any valuable information about the Japanese disposition.72 Their 
ability to build rapport with local islanders was often the only way they could escape 
detection by the Japanese. The Coastwatchers were collectively known as ―Ferdinand‖ 
and used their intelligence networks and guerrilla forces to report vital intelligence to the 
Allies, harass Japanese positions, and rescue downed pilots and stranded sailors, 
including a future U.S. President.73  
In 1942, the Japanese navy was equivalent in size to that of the United States and 
had developed some of the most effective sea-air operations in the world.74 The Japanese 
also had what many considered the best fighter aircraft and torpedoes available. Although 
they lacked effective radar, their night-fighting capability was highly proficient. After 
Pearl Harbor, the Japanese ―owned‖ the Pacific and began bombing inside the 
Coastwatchers’ range at Rabaul, New Guinea, in January 1942. In the spring of that year, 
the Allied Intelligence Bureau (AIB) was formed to control and integrate all 
unconventional intelligence operations in the area, and the Coastwatchers became a 
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section of the AIB. Although the Coastwatchers’ area of operations spread across both 
the South Pacific (commanded by Nimitz), and the Southwest Pacific (commanded by 
MacArthur), they ―received complete support from the U.S. forces in both areas.‖75 In 
addition, all civilian Coastwatchers were given official rank in the Australian Navy in the 
spring of 1942.76  
Feldt, who ensured that the men under his command were capable of operating 
behind enemy lines, commanded the Coastwatchers. Their ability to recruit natives and 
operate individually was extremely important.77 Equally critical was their ability to 
remain flexible: one moment a Coastwatcher was fighting the Japanese, the next minute 
he was ―settling a native marital dispute.‖78  
Planning ability was also vital since the supply lines were so tenuous. For 
instance, the teleradio, to include its charging engine and fuel, could only be moved via 
primitive means. This factor required additional native manpower, which meant added 
food and water. Natives were recruited to move supplies and obtain provisions from 
nearby villages. A Coastwatcher, therefore, was always under threat of betrayal. To 
survive in a foreign world, a Coastwatcher had to retain the cooperation of the natives.79  
Since living conditions were extremely challenging, only those who were young 
and could understand the climate survived in and around the islands. Only experienced 
islanders, usually Europeans who had spent at least four or five years living on an island, 
were successful; these men usually felt more at home in the islands than in ―civilization.‖ 
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friendship;‖ this relationship helped islanders forge bonds among themselves.80 They also 
tended to be loners who could think independently and ―reacted better to personal contact 
than general orders.‖81  
The Coastwatchers and their guerrillas killed 5,414, wounded 1,492, and captured 
74 Japanese while losing 37 Allies, two of whom were captured and survived, with 20 
natives killed and 40 captured. In addition, the Coastwatchers rescued 75 POWs, 321 
downed airmen, 280 stranded personnel, 190 civilians and missionaries, and an 
uncounted number of local refugees.82 Still, their main contribution was to supply 
accurate intelligence. Just a short phrase, such as ―forty bombers headed yours‖ gave the 
U.S. Marines on Guadalcanal enough time to react (usually about two hours).83 The 
results were often catastrophic for the Japanese, as their aircraft straggled back to base, 
sometimes with only a few left in the formation. The same Coastwatchers who reported 
the initial sortie would then count the number of returning aircraft. Not only did this 
success help boost Allied confidence, but as Eric Feldt summarized the Coastwatchers’ 
effect in Rabaul:  
And now 40,000 Japanese were held in that same Gazelle Peninsula 
[Rabaul, New Guinea] by 29 Coastwatchers and 400 armed natives. 
Hemmed in, its command of sea and air lost, the Rabaul garrison could 
only sit, helpless and ignoble, the limits of its hinterland defined by puny 
Ferdinand.84  
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D. THE BRITISH SPECIAL AIR SERVICE (SAS)85 
As the founding organizational design for most of today’s Special Operations 
units, the British Special Air Service (SAS) Regiment was originally created in 1941 by 
young Scottish Lieutenant David Sterling. Over subsequent decades, the SAS would be 
involved in numerous conflicts, from those that marked the decline of the British Empire 
to ongoing wars today in Afghanistan, Iraq, and Libya. Finding the right personnel has 
long proved critical to the success of the SAS, and its recruitment and selection process 
remain the model used by many other elite units.  
SAS units operate deep behind enemy lines, often without support, and must rely 
on initiative and extraordinary competence to complete their missions. Adaptability, 
flexibility, cunning, and interpersonal skills are all as important as physical stamina and 
strength. The SAS adheres to three primary tenets: ―the unrelenting pursuit of excellence; 
maintaining of the highest standards of discipline in all aspects of the daily life of a SAS 
soldier; the SAS brooks no sense of class and, particularly, not among the wives.‖86  
Determining how to recruit for its strategic and dangerous 1941 missions in North 
Africa devolved to David Sterling. Sterling was tasked with organizing his strike unit in 
Kabrit, near the Suez Canal. He had three months to train it before its first mission in 
November 1941. The force was designated L-Detachment, Special Air Service Brigade; 
even the name was a deception, designed to convince the Afrika Corps that an airborne 
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force was present. Sterling conducted initial recruitment among the Guards Commando 
unit garrisoned in a camp in Genefa. Recruitment was based solely on Sterling’s 
impressions during short interviews with interested soldiers. He ensured that selected 
volunteers understood that if they failed to complete his training, they would return to 
their original units. Sterling specifically recruited his initial officer corps from officers he 
knew from previous assignments.  
Most of those who initially joined had limited combat experience. They had cut 
their teeth with the Guards regiments and completed Commando training, and ranged in 
age from 18 to 40 years of age. L-Detachment established firm minimum standards for 
everyone, both officers and enlisted. When anyone failed, he was returned to his original 
unit (RTU), a procedure still in effect today. Sterling’s establishment of a meritocracy 
within SAS would shape the recruitment and selection of future elite units for decades.  
In the early 1950s, the SAS institutionalized its recruiting and selection 
procedures. The first postwar selection course, only a week long, focused on physical 
stamina and map reading abilities. Only with the next selection class did the SAS assess 
recruits for specific traits; a process very similar to that used by the Office of Strategic 
Services (OSS). The SAS selection course has not changed significantly to this day. 
Among other things, the SAS tested recruits’ bodies and minds ―to determine if they can 
operate effectively, both as individuals and as team members, while under prolonged 
periods of stress.‖87  
Recruiting for the SAS during the Borneo Campaign against Indonesia in the 
1960s proved difficult, as not many soldiers knew much about what the SAS actually did, 
and many conventional commanders wanted to avoid the loss of some of their most 
competent leaders.88 As losses and the difficulty of operations in Borneo slowly 
increased, manning became paramount. Although recruiting volunteers seemed to  
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improve in early 1964, the success rate for passing selection did not. For all of 1964, the 
SAS was in need of 66 men to outfit its operations fully in Borneo, but its recruitment 
efforts only netted 12 soldiers capable of passing selection.89  
Although the exact details of the British SAS selection process remain classified, 
the general concept is to assess a recruit’s mind and body under stress. For example, 
during an operation in Malaya, several psychologists followed an SAS element from its 
HQ in Hereford, England, into Malaya to study the men’s performance over several 
weeks of combat while performing support tasks.90 The psychologists found that the men 
who performed the best upon arrival were not the same men who performed best weeks 
later. In addition, the psychologists found they could predict the performance of the men 
in a tropical climate based on studies conducted before they departed chilly and rural 
Hereford.91 These results were implemented into the SAS selection process to test for 
traits that would identify men suitable for serving abroad on short notice. HQ found that 
the SAS soldier functions best in a ―small, family sized group that do not squander 
individuality.‖92 Precisely this dynamic has kept the size of each SAS maneuver element 
limited to four-man teams.93  
To describe accurately the men who volunteer for and complete SAS training is 
difficult. Most accepted into the SAS are in their late twenties with several years of prior 
military service.94 Good judgment in spite of stress and fatigue is considered a key trait 
by the SAS, which is a quality that usually comes with maturity. Despite the ferocity of 
its selection process, the SAS Regiment has approximately 400 operators.95 Nearly 20% 
of those who attempt to join the SAS actually succeed. During selection, the men are 
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administered computational tests, the 16PF personality test, and a psycho-dynamic test.96 
Psychologists test for men who are ―above average in intelligence, assertive, happy-go-
lucky, self-sufficient, and not extremely intro- or extraverted.‖97 Notably, the SAS does 
not want soldiers who are emotionally stable, but rather it seeks men who are forthright, 
hard to fool, and not dependent on others.98 This means the SAS’s basic philosophy for 
what it is looking for has not changed significantly since Major Newell drafted a paper on 
the subject in 1955:  
Selection is designed rather to find the individualist with a sense of self-
discipline than the man who is primarily a good member on a team. For 
the self-disciplined individualist will always fit well into a team when 
teamwork is required, but a man selected for team work is by no means 
always suitable for work outside the team.99  
Today, the SAS is open to men of any service within the British Armed Forces. 
This criterion provides the SAS with a number of candidates from unique 
backgrounds.100 The selection course begins with 10 days of map reading and physical 
fitness at the Brecon Beacons in South Wales. The candidates begin in groups of about 
twenty. In the Brecon Beacons, the weather is cold and wet. There, the candidates learn 
to navigate in featureless terrain using only a compass and distance method, which is a 
skill of critical importance to the SAS. Next, the volunteers must endure solitary long-
range foot movements with equipment (55 lbs rucksack and 10 lbs weapon), culminating 
in a 40-mile trek to be completed in less than 20 hours.101 Those deemed not suitable, but 
who have not quit, are returned to their unit (RTU) at the completion of selection.  
Throughout, recruits are tested for reactions to loneliness and unusual situations 
when fatigued. After selection is complete, candidates must next complete 14 weeks of 
basic SAS skills training, followed by airborne school and survival and evasion training. 
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If a candidate completes all of these qualifications, he is considered ―badged‖ (i.e., he 
earns his beret and cap-badge). Even with this accomplishment, he must yet finish 
training in communications, linguistics, field medical care, or explosives.  
During WWII, Eisenhower once wrote to those serving in the SAS, ―the 
ruthlessness with which the enemy has attacked the SAS troops has been an indication of 
the injury which you were able to cause to the German armed forces both by your own 
efforts and by the information which you gave of German dispositions and 
movements.‖102  
For over 60 years, the men of the SAS have held themselves to an extremely high 
standard that has paid strategic dividends for Britain. From Southeast Asia to the Middle 
East, the SAS deploy worldwide at a moment’s notice to serve Britain’s national 
interests. To maintain this unique capability, Britain must find the best soldiers within 
Britain’s military to serve in the SAS. Its methods for recruiting and selecting the right 
type of soldier are the bellwether for the world’s special operations forces. These high 
standards seem especially worth noting given the current financial crisis when limited 
funds and a smaller military make this effort even more difficult.  
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E. U.S. NAVY SEALS (SEA, AIR, & LAND)103 
Today’s U.S. Navy Sea-Air-Land commandos, or SEALs, are descendents of the 
Navy frogmen of WWII. Those early predecessors of today’s SEALs were selected 
because of their extensive swimming experience and conditioning. A heavy emphasis 
was then placed on demolitions under heightened stress levels (likely assisted by training 
in and around the alligator swamps of Fort Pierce, Florida). Men from the 34 Underwater 
Demolition Teams (UDT) of WWII formed the backbone of the first SEAL units. The 
first two SEAL Teams, officially activated on January 1, 1962, by President John F. 
Kennedy, conducted ―unconventional warfare, counter-guerrilla operations, and 
clandestine missions in maritime and riverine environments.‖104  
In Vietnam, the SEALs began advising the South Vietnamese in ―clandestine 
maritime operations.‖105 They also conducted direct action missions in the Rung Sat 
Special Zone. All remaining UDT personnel would eventually become designated SEALs 
in 1983. SEALs have since participated in operations in Grenada, Panama, the Persian  
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Gulf, Somalia, Bosnia, Haiti, Liberia, Afghanistan, and Iraq. Today, their core missions 
include Direct Action (DA) and Special Reconnaissance (SR), but also Unconventional 
Warfare (UW) and Foreign Internal Defense (FID).106  
SEAL training is among the most difficult to be found in any military in the 
world, with a selection success rate of approximately 30 percent.107 The Navy focuses on 
recruiting ―young capable athletes.‖108 Enlisted SEAL recruits are mostly initial entry 
sailors who join the Navy specifically to become SEALs. Interestingly, recruitment for 
officer candidates is almost unnecessary, since most officers must already have joined the 
Navy, are older than most enlisted recruits, and are well aware of the high standards 
required to pass Basic Underwater Demolition/SEAL School (BUD/S). Also, positions 
for officers are very limited and most officers must pass a formal screening board. Often, 
many officers will meet the requirements to pass BUD/S, but only those with the 
requisite ―maturity, athletic strength and team experience, focus, and exceptional 
Physical Screening Test (PST) scores‖ are accepted.109 Even so, the driving force for 
overall SEAL selection is not finding men with excellent social skills or aptitude for 
unconventional warfare. Rather, the aim is to identify exceptional athletes with a high 
level of fitness and mental toughness.  
For a Navy recruit to become a SEAL today, he must successfully complete more 
than 12 months of initial training, including BUD/S, Parachute Jump School (static-line 
and free-fall), and SEAL Qualification Training (SQT).110 Unlike the U.S. Army Special 
                                                 
106 SEALs have historically been focused on direct action and special reconnaissance missions, but 
recently, they have concentrated more on indirect mission that incorporate operations ―by, with, and 
through‖ a surrogate or indigenous force, similar to missions more commonly conducted by U.S. Army 
Special Forces; see Joint Pub 3-05 ―Doctrine for Joint Special Operations‖ 
http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/new_pubs/jp3_05.pdf; while both SEALs and U.S. Army SF can conduct the 
same range of mission sets (DA, SR, UW, and FID), the SEAL organizational has a DA ―culture‖ within 
the organization which may not be as well suited for UW operations with indigenous forces; see Peterson, 
―The Strategic Utility of U.S. Navy SEALs,‖ 15. 
107 Lisa J. Mills and Janet D. Held, ―Optimizing U.S. Navy SEAL Selection,‖ U.S. Navy Selection & 
Classification Office, 46th Annual International Military Testing Association Conference October 26–28, 
2004, http://www.internationalmta.org/Documents/2004/2004072P.pdf.  
108 Peterson, ―The Strategic Utility of U.S. Navy SEALs,‖ ,22.  
109 Ibid., 24.  
110 U.S. Navy Recruiting Command, ―Navy SEALs (Sea, Air & Land).‖  
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Forces SFAS program, the SEALs do not separate BUD/S into an initial selection and 
assessment phase, but utilize ―Hell Week‖ during BUD/S as a significant selection 
milestone.111 As with other SOF selection processes, SEAL candidates are continuously 
assessed for their organizational fit, and those found undesirable or unable to meet the 
high standard are dropped from training. To attend BUD/S, male volunteers must pass the 
initial screening process. A candidate must be no older than 28 and a U.S. citizen, must 
pass a physical examination for divers, and must meet physical screening test 
requirements.112 In addition, a candidate’s eyesight must be 20/40 in his best eye and 
20/70 in his worst eye, correctable to 20/25 with no color blindness. Also, each candidate 
must surpass a minimum ASVAB score.113  
With the high demand for additional SEALs after September 11, 2001, the Navy 
reconsidered how to recruit men into the community. Instead of just increasing the 
number of recruits volunteering for SEAL training, the Navy chose to concentrate on the 
quality of the recruits reporting to BUD/S. Naval Special Warfare (NAVSPECWAR) 
began several initiatives that have dramatically improved the success rate of those 
volunteering for BUD/S. For instance, a SEAL Production Process Improvement (SPPI) 
working group was developed in 2006 to improve how to find the right men who could 
pass BUD/S and SQT with the expressed provision of not lowering standards to gain 
more SEALs.114  
First, the Navy Recruiting Command designed a Special Operations Mentor 
Program at each U.S. Navy Recruiting District. This program enables any recruit in a 
delayed entry program to be matched with a retired SEAL, EOD, or Navy diver to ensure 
the recruit maintains a high level of fitness, in addition to making it easy for him to learn 
more about the SEALs prior to entering recruit training. In an effort to reduce recruit 
                                                 
111 In five days of continuous training, SEAL candidates are only authorized four hours of sleep total.  
112 Includes swim 500 yards within 12 minutes 30 seconds, rest 10 minutes, 42 push-ups within 2 
minutes, rest 2 minutes, 50 sit-ups within 2 minutes, rest 2 minutes, 6 pull-ups (no time limit), rest 10 
minutes, 1.5 mile run within 11 minutes. 
113 ASVAB score must be either 165 (GS+MC+EI) or 220 (VE+MK+MC+CS); see U.S. Navy 
Recruiting Command, ―Navy SEALs (Sea, Air & Land).‖  
114 NSW Center Public Affairs, ―Growing the Force,‖ Ethos 8 (2010): 17. 
http://www.sealswcc.com/navy-seals-ethos-magazine.aspx.  
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losses prior to BUD/S, all recruits with SEAL contracts complete their basic training 
together in a special group, which allows a medical officer to rectify any medical 
problems found in the recruit’s record. This special group also conducts additional 
physical training to reduce the normal decline in physical fitness that commonly occurs 
during Navy boot camp, while also keeping recruits with similar career goals together. In 
addition, Naval Special Warfare (NSW) established an 8-week long preparatory school 
following boot camp that focuses on preparing candidates physically and mentally for the 
challenges of BUD/S.115  
To combat chronically low minority representation found on the SEAL Teams (or 
in all of SOF for that matter), the Navy hired contractors to assist with a diversity 
initiative. There suggestions were to renew SEAL outreach efforts to historically black 
colleges and universities. In addition, the SEALs also now use marketing strategies that 
increase awareness, screening, and recruiting in minority communities.116 As of May 
2010, only 10% of SEAL officers are minorities (with blacks comprising only 2% of 
SEAL officers); minorities compose less than 20% of enlisted personnel within the 
NAVSPECWAR community.117  
NSW also developed a new screening test for SEAL recruits that could predict 
with 97% accuracy who would likely fail BUD/S by the end of Hell Week.118 This new 
screening tool identified 20% of those who would have likely failed in previous BUD/S 
classes. In addition, vision standards were made more stringent because candidates with 
poorer vision were historically 50% less likely to complete SEAL training.  
                                                 
115 All enlisted SEAL candidates take this course in which candidates exercise five days a week, and 
learning running, swimming, and other testable skills at BUD/S. They also learn SEAL heritage, history, 
military bearing, ethics, the SEAL Ethos, mental toughness, nutrition, stretching and physical training 
theory.  
116 Gidget Fuentes, ―Navy SEALs Seek Minority Candidates,‖ Navy Times, November 8, 2010, 
http://www.navytimes.com/news/2010/11/navy-seal-diversity-110610w/. 
117 Fuentes, ―Navy SEALs Seek Minority Candidates,‖ Navy Times, November 8, 2010.  
118 When this screening test was combined with the other predictors, the result was a new assessment 
–The Computerized Special Operations Resiliency Test (C-SORT). It was developed over three years to 
measure a candidate’s tolerance for psychological adversity, or ―mental toughness‖; see NSW Center 
Public Affairs, ―Growing the Force,‖ Ethos 8 (2010): 17–18.  
 37 
In an effort to be even more efficient, the Naval Special Warfare Recruiting 
Directorate (NSWRD) spent $500,000 on a contract with Gallup, a human behavior 
research organization, to determine the ideal SEAL recruit. Gallup found that young men 
who played water polo, rock climbed, or mountain biked were more likely to pass SEAL 
training. Interestingly, if a recruit played chess, his odds of becoming a SEAL increased 
threefold!119 Gallup identified the following as worthy of a SEAL profile. 
 Traditional sports: water polo, triathlon, lacrosse, boxing, rugby, 
swimming, and wrestling 
 Alternative sports: skiing, snowboarding, mountain biking, climbing, 
rappelling, martial arts 
 Height: At least 5 feet 8 inches 
 Weight: At least 162 pounds 
 Age: 22 to 25  
 Education: Bachelor’s degree 
 Hobbies: Hunting, woodworking, chess 
 Geography: Grew up in New England (Vermont, New Hampshire, Maine, 
Massachusetts, Connecticut and Rhode Island), the Northern Plains (North 
and South Dakota, Minnesota, Nebraska, Iowa, Kansas and Missouri), or 
the West Coast (California, Washington and Oregon).120  
The SEALs have also developed a long-term engagement strategy for their 
recruitment efforts. They have forged a special relationship with high schools in the San 
Diego area and water polo players are invited to attend a SEAL fitness challenge. Here 
these young men run, swim, and perform push-ups under the mentorship of veteran 
SEALs.121 Each participant participates in a 500-yard swim, push-ups, sit-ups, pull-ups, 
and a 1.5-mile run. Fitness challenges occurred in Minneapolis, Boston, San Antonio, 
Los Angeles, Dearborn, and Chicago between 2006 and 2008.122 In addition, the SEALs 
hosted the ―America’s Finest City Tournament Men’s High School Water Polo 
                                                 
119 Jeanette Steele, ―Study Points SEAL Recruiters toward Athletes,‖ San Diego Union Tribune, 
March 15, 2010, http://www.signonsandiego.com/news/2010/mar/15/navys-seriously-sports/.  
120 Ibid. 
121 Ibid. 
122 Dave Hecht, ―Naval Special Warfare Center Recruiting Directorate,‖ NSW Conference for 
America, October 18, 2007, 
http://www.navy.mil/navco/cfa08/NSW%20Conf.%20for%20America%202.pdf.  
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Invitational,‖ with 32 teams competing at four host sites in 2007. This tournament 
introduced 600 elite high school water polo players to the SEALs and attracted TV 
coverage on local NBC & Fox affiliates.123  
Gallup also recommended that the SEALs develop something with a ―dog 
whistle‖ effect on teenage boys, with the SEALs sending out a ―signal‖ that the right 
candidates would hear and respond.124 The Gallup study found that engaging young men 
early was vital; age 15 was not too young to grab a boy’s attention, while a predictor of 
success during Hell Week was a longtime familiarity with the SEALs, ideally initiated 
before the age of 10. Consequently, Gallup suggested that the Navy find an agency 
specializing in child marketing to ―establish awareness among young boys.‖125 The 
SEALs even developed their own extreme sporting event open to the public: the Super 
Frog Half Iron-Man, which is held on Coronado Island each September.126 A half-hour 
long TV program about the triathlon airs on the local FOX TV station in San Diego, as 
well as on the Military Channel, and Footlocker produced a 90-second highlight video to 
air in 2,300 stores across the country starting in November 2007.127  
The SEALs even developed a Boy Scouts of America Navy SEAL Activity Badge 
Test given annually at scout fairs, jamborees, and at Navy Recruiting districts. To prepare 
the Boy Scouts for the event, the NSWRD produced a SEAL/Scout workout video.128 
Additionally, the NSWRD website, www.sealswcc.com, has been updated to provide 
potential candidates with accurate information about optimal physical preparation, 
nutrition, and the nature of a SEAL career. The website even provides a forum on which 
young men can discuss their preparations with each other and with NSWRD 
personnel.129  
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125 Ibid.  
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127 Hecht, ―Naval Special Warfare Center Recruiting Directorate.‖  
128 Ibid.  
129 NSW Center Public Affairs, ―Growing the Force,‖ Ethos 8 (2010): 17. 
 39 
F. DELTA FORCE130 
Terrorist incidents like the 1976 hijacking of the Air France airliner in Entebbe 
and the seizure of Israeli athletes in Munich helped convince a doubtful Pentagon of the 
importance of the United States standing up its own counter-terrorist force.131 
Consequently, Special Forces Operational Detachment-Delta (SFOD-D), or Delta Force, 
was officially established on November 19, 1977, largely due to the efforts of Colonel 
Charlie Beckwith.132 COL Beckwith was a SF officer who had been randomly assigned 
in 1962 to serve in an exchange program with the British 22nd Special Air Service 
(SAS). His assignment with the SAS inspired him to form Delta Force.133 Beckwith’s 
experience with the small, elite British unit convinced him that the United States needed 
to create a counter-terrorist/hostage rescue capability. However, not until the Pentagon 
agreed could he begin finding the right men.  
While assigned to the 22nd SAS Regiment, Beckwith commanded Three Troop of 
A Squadron. During this assignment, he was introduced to the informal yet extremely 
proficient SAS culture. He found that the SAS focused solely on ―high quality and battle 
discipline,‖ with little respect for drill or ceremonies. A graduate of the U.S. Army 
Ranger School, Beckwith struggled through the SAS land-navigation exercises over 
lengthy distances carrying a heavy rucksack and weapon from one rendezvous point (RV) 
to another. Minimal guidance was given and questions were not allowed; men would 
have to run most of the night during an exercise just to meet the unknown time standard. 
Failure was not tolerated well; if a soldier missed an RV, he remained at the RV without 
food. If a soldier became completely lost, he was forced to submerge all of his gear 
underwater and remain wet for the duration of the exercise.  
                                                 
130 Due to the secrecy of Delta Force, only a limited number of open source references discuss the 
organization and its recruitment and selection process. These include Charlie A Beckwith and Donald 
Knox, Delta Force (New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich Publishers, 1983); Pete Blaber, The Mission, 
the Men, and Me (New York: Berkley Caliber, 2008); Eric L. Haney, Inside Delta Force (New York: 
Bantam Dell, 2002).  
131 Ian D. W. Sutherland, Special Forces of the United States Army (San Jose, CA: R. James Bender 
Publishing, 1990), 119.  
132 Beckwith and Knox, Delta Force, 133.  
133 Ibid., 12.  
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While serving with the 22nd SAS, Beckwith witnessed entire SAS selection 
courses that no one passed. If a man passed, his success signified he ―enjoyed being 
alone, could think and operate by himself, and was strong-minded and resolute.‖134 Many 
men had to give up their current rank to join the SAS, only to work their way back up the 
promotion system.  
As a Troop Commander, Beckwith participated in a combined exercise between 
the SAS and the French Berets Rouges in Corsica, which involved an escape and evasion 
exercise. He then deployed with his Troop to Malaya near the Thai-Malaya border, where 
the SAS had become famous for counter-insurgency operations years earlier. While 
recuperating from leptospirosis in a British hospital, Beckwith began to develop his plan 
to build an American version of the SAS, a force that could operate deep behind enemy 
lines in small teams and provide a strategic offensive role.  
After his assignment with the SAS, and on his return to the United States, 
Beckwith commanded B-52 (DELTA Project), part of the 5th Special Forces Group in 
Vietnam from 1966–1967. He would later utilize both his SAS and Vietnam experiences 
to run the Special Forces School as its director in 1977, at the end of which, he was 
chosen to stand up his American SAS unit, Delta Force.135 He had two years to find the 
right men and train them.  
Beckwith sent his initial recruiters all over the U.S. Army to recruit willing, fit, 
and trainable men. He would eventually establish the following criteria for a potential 
recruit:  
Perform well at their assigned MOS, in his second enlistment, no limiting 
physical profile, at least 22 years old and an American citizen, a GT score 
of 110, pass a background security check, pass a modified Special Forces 
Physical Training test and physical examination, be airborne or volunteer 
for airborne training, have no reoccurring disciplinary record, have two 
years of active service remaining, and pass the Delta Force selection 
course.136  
                                                 
134 Beckwith and Knox, Delta Force, 20. 
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The first selection course was modeled after Beckwith’s SAS experience. Thirty 
combat-proven men from within the SF community were chosen for the first course to 
create a cadre for future Delta Force selection courses. This first course occurred in the 
Uwharrie National Forest near Troy, North Carolina. Seven men passed the first Delta 
Force selection course, which was later moved to Camp Dawson, West Virginia, where 
the terrain was more difficult and, thus, more similar to the SAS’s Brecon Beacons. The 
second selection course graduated only five soldiers.137  
―Selection,‖ as it became known, began with a Ranger/Special Forces PT test 
conducted in fatigues and combat boots with no breaks between events and graded at the 
17-year-old scale. The events included push-ups, sit-ups, a running dodge-jump, an 
inverted crawl, and a two-mile run. An initial road march of 18 miles introduced the 
recruits to their next few weeks in West Virginia.138  
Detailed psychological evaluations, lasting four hours per recruit, closed out the 
first Selection course. Subsequent Selection courses used psychological written tests 
administered repeatedly throughout, with only minor wording changes between tests. By 
randomly repeating questions, the psychologists would be able to defeat duplicity or 
deception. Recruits were always given the tests when they were tired but never 
exhausted, presumably because it was easier to be truthful when tired since being truthful 
required much less energy. Even odd questions like ―is your stool black and tarry?‖ had a 
purpose; it might indicate that a recruit has an ulcer or a drinking problem, since black 
and tarry stool is an indicator for blood in the digestive system.139  
Beckwith patterned the stress level in Selection after the 22nd SAS. All recruits 
performed individual, timed, land-navigation exercises in the challenging mountainous 
terrain of West Virginia. Recruits were given a prescribed load and instructed to move 
between RVs until an instructor informed them to remove their rucksacks.140 The 
distances traveled increased daily from 10 km to 74 km and equipment weighed from 50 
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to 70 pounds. By the time recruits had made it to the 45-mile final event, they had 
reached a common level of exhaustion. This long journey revealed the men who had 
―determination, self-discipline, and self-sacrifice.‖141 During the 45 miler, each recruit 
was given a RV point to move towards, but never knew the number of remaining RV 
points, the routes he would have to take, or whether he was traveling too slowly. After 
the 12th hour, a recruit usually found either a reason to quit or a way to meet the time 
requirement. The cadre running selection was very businesslike and never shouted at a 
recruit or offered encouragement. Cadre often repeated a common phrase throughout 
selection, like ―have a good-un,‖ to help keep a recruit unaware of his performance.142  
Most recruits could already operate as members of a team before attending 
Selection, but Selection measured whether the recruits could operate as individuals. At 
any time, a recruit could voluntarily withdraw and he would receive no negative report in 
his record; he simply returned to his original unit. Recruits were competing against an 
unknown time standard, not each other, and fought to stay ahead of the ―overdue time,‖ 
which could result in dismissal. If a candidate missed an RV point, he was dropped. The 
fear of failing and returning to his unit was a strong motivator for many.  
Beckwith was looking for a particular type of man, one who was ―inquisitive, 
sensitive, resourceful, and imaginative‖ and could easily transition between being 
extremely patient and extremely aggressive.143 Additionally, each member had to be 
comfortable in both a heavily constrained and a highly unstable and complex 
environment where orders could be either specific or absent altogether. These 
requirements were often measured by ensuring that all instructions were written on a 
bulletin board, but were also very vague; furthermore, men were not restricted to the 
camp but were only required to follow the written instructions. Each member, thus, had 
to transition from being a leader to being a follower, in addition to enduring prolonged 
physical and mental activity or extended monotony. 
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III. UNCONVENTIONAL WARFARE TALENT 
Talent is defined by the specific attributes necessary for success and achievement 
in a particular activity. Superior talent is the principal means of preserving the 
competitive advantage in high performing organizations.144 A talented violinist and a 
talented boxer share little in common concerning their particular professions. However, a 
talented policeman and firefighter may share overlapping abilities. Actively looking for 
men with traits necessary for effective UW, therefore, may lead a recruiter to search in 
populations beyond the normal sources of SF volunteers.  
Talent is not simply a function of skill, perfection, experience, or physical 
characteristics, and in UW, talent often involves turning challenges into opportunity.145 
Organizational performance can be significantly increased based on talent alone. The 
effects of increasing talent can be easily measured in business. After three years of 
research studying the relationship between talent and performance inside 56 different 
companies (including 35 with over $1 billion in revenue), Jeffrey Christian determined 
that talent proved decisive. The most talented performers were 50–100% more productive 
than their peers.146 Talented people, thus, can make a significant difference, but they are 
often rare. The difference between high- and average-performing organizations is not 
better human resource processes, but rather the emphasis on talent.147  
Talent on the unconventional warfare battlefield is multidimensional and more 
challenging than the profit-driven bottom line of the business world. Motivating and 
leading other men to resist and overthrow the members of their state or the occupying 
power is extremely difficult. Measuring the capacity for success under these 
                                                 
144 Jean-Marie Hiltrop, ―The Quest for the Best: Human Resource Practices to Attract and Retain 
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circumstances may be more challenging still. Even with all of the mobilization resources 
in the United States during WWII, the OSS Assessment Staff quickly realized how 
difficult it is to predict accurately human behavior in a combat environment. A Burmese-
speaking individual with exceptional knowledge of the Burmese culture may become 
craven once he is deployed in the remote jungles to live and fight with guerrillas. 
Likewise, a daring combat-proven veteran with expertise in small unit tactics may 
despise working with the very guerrillas that he is charged with advising, which leads to 
an irreparable loss of rapport for him and future advisors. Unconventional warfare has 
historically been an exceedingly unpredictable form of warfare and lacks a detailed 
prescriptive for success. In Chapter II, however, the review of extremely successful UW 
units suggests a combination of motivation, interpersonal intelligence, cross-cultural 




Figure 2.   UW-Talent Model 
                                                 
148 Several informal discussions conducted by the author with mid-level officers within the U.S. Army 
SF and U.S. Navy SEALs also indicated that motivation, interpersonal intelligence, cross-cultural 
capability, and adaptability were traits most important held by operators, both officer and NCO, which are 
considered to be the ―most talented‖ for UW.  
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A. MOTIVATION 
Motivation may be the single most important trait in an individual selected for 
UW operations. When the OSS Assessment Staff analyzed motivation in potential 
recruits, they looked at a candidate’s desire to accomplish goals and the energy and 
initiative displayed in pursuit of these goals in the OSS. Motivation for assignment was 
considered a prerequisite by many and was used as a condition in screening potential 
recruits.149 As in other UW organizations, SACO volunteers could quit at any time. Since 
they were expected to live, eat, and fight as Chinese, any lack of motivation overseas 
could prove disastrous. The Coastwatchers were all civilian volunteers who chose to fight 
and survive in the island terrain. Without the drive to fight and survive, the 
Coastwatchers’ abilities to influence the locals and provide intelligence on the Japanese 
would have been unsuccessful, with potentially disastrous effects. Delta Force and the 
SAS relied on solitary long-distance military orienteering to test the motivation of each 
recruit. The Navy SEALs conduct similar evaluations using extended swimming in cold 
water to measure a recruit’s internal motivation. In case after case, it becomes clear that 
UW organizations must have men with unquestioned motivation.  
B. INTERPERSONAL INTELLIGENCE 
Throughout Unconventional Warfare history, interpersonal intelligence has been 
essential.150 The ability to work with other people, often from a different race and 
culture, has been a significant factor in success. For instance, in the realm of advising, 
host-nation commanders ―believed that mutual trust and respect, as well as an open, 
honest willingness to work together, were more important traits for an adviser than 
military competence … to be effective, advisers needed interpersonal and intercultural 
skills more than military skills.‖151 Rapport is never permanent and can easily be 
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damaged by misunderstandings compounded by language, cultural, personal, or 
institutional differences, in addition to honest disagreements.152  
Howard Gardner describes several forms of intelligence in Frames of Mind, 
including linguistic, musical, logic-math, spatial, body coordination, intrapersonal, and 
interpersonal. Personal intelligence links two forms of intelligence together, intrapersonal 
intelligence and interpersonal intelligence. Intrapersonal intelligence describes the ability 
for an individual to read and assess his own feelings, while interpersonal intelligence 
allows him to notice and differentiate among other people’s moods, motivations, and 
intentions.153 Interpersonal intelligence is particularly important to UW because if one 
understands the feelings, responses, and behavior of the partisan force he is working by, 
with, and through, he will be more likely to interact appropriately with them and secure 
his proper place within the larger community.154  
Common sense is another form of interpersonal intelligence and is the ability to 
―deal with problems in an intuitive, rapid and accurate manner.‖155 Ironically, it appears 
to be mislabeled as ―common‖ and much less easily measurable. Common sense is the 
capacity to bring together a vast amount of information and make it part of a general and 
effective plan of action. Interpersonal intelligence also encompasses Malcolm Gladwell’s 
practical intelligence, which is different from other cognitive abilities and provides the 
knowledge that helps one read a situation and say the right thing at the right time. It is 
procedural–knowing how to do something, without necessarily knowing why.156  
While recruiting men for SACO, Miles was most concerned with maintaining 
cooperation and rapport, for interpersonal intelligence figured significantly into that 
ability. The Coastwatchers had to remain socially vigilant because they were always 
under the risk of treachery by a hired native. The British SAS similarly relied heavily on 
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rapport built with natives in Malaya during the 1950s and again in Borneo during the 
1960s. Support from these local tribes built an intelligence network that helped locate the 
enemy; in Malaya the phrase, ―hearts and minds‖ was coined.157 Reading tense social 
situations and motivations was necessary for survival, as well as for maintaining the 
support network in the jungle. Finally, the OSS became aware of failures in the field due 
to lack of interpersonal intelligence. The following memorandum from early 1943, before 
the Assessment Staff began work, illustrates the problems the OSS experienced by 
recruiting men lacking in interpersonal intelligence. According to the report:  
The organization has been recruiting too many men, civilian or military, 
who have intelligence and sometimes the necessary mechanical training 
but who lack common sense, know nothing about working with men or 
how to look after the welfare and the morale of men under them. We 
simply must have men who can shoulder responsibility and use initiative 
with common sense. Simply because a man has intelligence does not 
qualify him for this type of work. In some instances, we have men who 
fall into the class of the high-strung or emotional type. We simply cannot 
use men of that type in the field when they have to live with Chinese, eat 
Chinese food, and be under pressure at times.158  
C. CROSS-CULTURAL CAPABILITY  
Intertwined with interpersonal intelligence is cross-cultural capability. While not 
unique to UW, understanding and working within the culture of the local force is vital in 
all UW operations. The desire to learn the ethnography of the guerrilla force and to work 
within its framework can mean the difference between success and failure. Thus, finding 
men who are comfortable working truly ―by, with, and through‖ often means selecting 
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different people. Combining models of language proficiency and regional-specific 
knowledge with cultural intelligence produces an overarching model of cultural 
capability (Figure 3).159  
 
 
Figure 3.   Cross-Cultural Capability Components  
While language proficiency is a product of education and regional-specific 
knowledge represents a combination of education and travel experience, cultural 
intelligence refers to the correct interpretation of unfamiliar verbal and nonverbal cues in 
different cultural circumstances. Culturally intelligent individuals: 
Exhibit impression awareness, that is, knowledge that provides a basis for 
people to know how others form impressions and an ability to predict 
them, possess knowledge of cultural differences, that is, anticipate cause-
effect social relationships and social rules across cultures, and have the 
ability to successfully translate intentions to perform and produce a 
particular behavior.160 
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160 Lenkov and Pimentel, ―Social Intelligence, Emotional Intelligence, and Cultural Intelligence: An 
Integrative Perspective,‖ 296–297.  
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Knowing how natives form impressions is dependent upon the understanding that 
individuals from different cultures have different experiences from the individual and 
from the larger group. For example, Eastern cultures typically view the ―self‖ as a 
product of established community relationships, whereas Westerners tend to ―value 
independence, self-reliance, and focus on individual growth.‖161 Among those familiar 
with these kinds of differences are missionaries, but even proselytizing has begun to 
change. Instead of living abroad for long periods, short-term missions have become more 
common.162 Most of today’s missionaries travel into other countries for only a limited 
time unlike earlier missionaries that spent a lifetime in a foreign country. The result of 
short-term missionary work is a failure to gain regional specific knowledge about other 
cultures. The category width of these short-term missionaries produces narrow 
categorizers who place most issues into categories of right versus wrong with a very 
small category for things that were simply different (Figure 4). However, longer exposure 
to other cultures may allow an individual to become a wider categorizer who lengthens 
the category of different while still maintaining personal feelings of right versus wrong 
(Figure 4).163 
 
Figure 4.   Category Width164 
                                                 
161 Lenkov and Pimentel, ―Social Intelligence, Emotional Intelligence, and Cultural Intelligence: An 
Integrative Perspective,‖ 297. 
162 David Livermore, ―Cultural Intelligence and Short-Term Missions: the Phenomenon of the Fifteen-
year-old Missionary,‖ in Handbook of Cultural Intelligence: Theory, Measurement, and Applications, 
edited by Soon Ang and Linn Van Dyne (Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe, Inc., 2008), 271–288. 
163 Ibid., 278. 
164 See R. Detwiler, ―Culture, Category Width, and Attributions,‖ Journal of Cross-Cultural 
Psychology 9 (1978) 259–284; T. F. Pettigrew, ―The Measurement and Correlates of Category Width as a 
Cognitive Variable,‖ Journal of Personality 26 (1958): 532–44.  
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Language proficiency is another important component for UW operations. A 
Coastwatcher had to learn the local pidgin, which could take up to a year. OSS Jedburgh 
members in Nazi occupied France had to speak French fluently to coordinate guerrilla 
activities. Likewise, the SAS needed language proficiency during operations in Southeast 
Asia and in Oman in 1972 to defeat communist guerrillas in the southern mountains of 
Dhofar.165  
Perhaps nowhere was the lack of language proficiency more detrimental than 
many of the key personnel in the Department of State during the Cold War. Several 
ambassadors were unable to speak the native languages of their assigned country, 
including ambassadors assigned to France, Italy, Germany, Belgium, the Netherlands, 
Norway, and Turkey. Since these representatives are actually more than figureheads and 
serve as leaders of our diplomatic corps in a given country, poor understanding can 
produce bad results.166  
D. ADAPTABILITY  
The unpredictability of conflict, especially in UW, demands flexible, adaptive 
personnel and organizations. In fact, successful UW units by definition are adaptable. 
Adaptability involves a ―functional change in response to actual or correctly anticipated 
alterations in environmental contingencies.‖167 Beyond just being capable of adapting, 
UW soldiers must be able to thrive in a complex and unstable environment. The OSS 
Assessment staff measured for adaptability, and the SAS and Delta Force selection 
processes assessed a recruit’s ability to adapt to ambiguous situations, such as unknown 
standards for performance.  
                                                 
165 Geraghty, Inside the S.A.S., 131.  
166 Willian J. Lederer and Eugene Burdick, The Ugly American (New York: W.W. Norton & 
Company, Inc., 1958), 273.  
167 Stephen J. Zaccaro, Deanna Banks, Lee Kiechel-Koles, Cary Kemp, and Paige Bader, ―Leader and 
Team Adaptation: The Influence and Development of Key Attributes and Processes,‖ U.S. Army Research 
Institute for the Behavioral and Social Sciences, Technical Report 1256, August 2009.  
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E. ASSESSING UW-TALENT 
If each organization described in Chapter II was analyzed using ordinal 
measurements for the qualitative components for UW talent—motivation, interpersonal 
intelligence, cross-cultural capability, and adaptability—the results are as follows: the 
OSS, SACO, and Coastwatchers scored higher for interpersonal intelligence and cross-
cultural capability, whereas the Navy SEALs and Delta Force scored higher for 
motivation and adaptability. The SAS ranges between these two units (Table 1).  
Table 1.   UW Talent Across Different Organizations 





Motivation 4 3 4 1 1 1 
Interpersonal 
Intelligence 
1 2 2 4 3 3 
Cross-Cultural 
Capability 
2 1 1 2 4 4 
Adaptability 3 4 3 3 2 2 
 
As with any model, issues arise with simplifying what constitutes talent in each of 
these organizations. None of these organizations has (or had) the identical mission, and 
the OSS, SACO, and Coastwatchers no longer exist; while their histories are available, 
current details on SAS and Delta Force are restricted to only a handful of published 
books. Additionally, all four components for UW talent are interrelated. The following 
have been determined: the more UW focused units (e.g. OSS, SACO, Coastwatchers) 
tend to value interpersonal intelligence and cross-cultural capability; UW-like or UW-DA 
hybrid organizations, (e.g., SAS, Navy SEALs, Delta Force) tend to prize motivation and 
adaptability, probably considering cross-cultural capability less important.  
 52 
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 53 
IV. SPECIAL FORCES RECRUITMENT 
The process of recruitment and selection of personnel in any organization that 
operates in challenging environments has two primary goals, to select out (selection) and 
in (recruitment). Selecting out minimizes the risks of selecting personnel unfit for the 
unit, while selecting in identifies applicants especially suited for high performance in the 
task environment. Recruitment is a ―positive‖ action through which candidates are found 
for possible employment, while selection serving as the ―negative‖ complement by 
screening recruits for those most likely to succeed.168 In reality, it is difficult to separate 
recruitment and selection, since some selectivity must be exercised in any recruitment.169  
I volunteer for Special Forces training and duty. I further volunteer to 
perform frequent aircraft flights, glider flights, parachute jumps, and 
participate in realistic combat training while receiving airborne and/or 
Special Forces training and performing Special Forces duty.170 
The above passage was taken from the first SF application in 1952. Recruits 
submitted their application and were chosen based on their paper record, unless they 
knew current SF members. Former soldiers with WWII SOF or Ranger experience were 
targeted for recruitment, but more men were needed. Therefore, new recruits were added. 
They were expected to be at least 21, physically fit, psychological sound (they had to 
pass a test), and they had to already be, or willing to be, qualified parachutists. These men 
were usually required to be qualified as infantryman, radio operators, medics, or 
demolitions experts.171 Many of the experienced soldiers had language skills from 
previous service in the OSS. In 1952, however, just being a qualified parachutist nearly 
                                                 
168 Iain Grant, Hege R. Eriksen, Peter Marquis, Ingrid J. Orre, Lawrence A. Palinkas, Peter Suedfeld, 
Erling Svensen, and Holger Ursin, ―Psychological Selection of Antarctic Personnel: The ―SOAP‖ 
Instrument,‖ Aviation, Space, and Environmental Medicine 78, no. 8 (2007): 799. 
169 Harold C. Stone and William E. Kendall, Effective Personnel Selection Procedures (Englewood 
Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1956), 20.  
170 This was the first paragraph of the required letter for application to SF from April 25, 1952; see 
Sutherland, Special Forces of the United States Army, 120. 
171 Michael McClintock, ―Toward a Doctrine of Special Warfare—Cold War and Covert Action: 
From OSS to CIA,‖ Instruments of Statecraft: U.S. Guerilla Warfare, Counterinsurgency, and 
Counterterrorism, 1940–1990, 2002, http://www.statecraft.org/chapter2.html. 
 54 
guaranteed selection into SF.172 At the time, no single recruiting organization was 
dedicated to find men for SF. In addition, no selection and assessment process existed to 
screen out unsuitable recruits. Men with proven combat experience were sometimes 
assigned to the same units as those with no experience. Even the future Delta Force 
founder, COL Beckwith, was issued his green beret but was not forced to earn it.173 The 
recruitment and selection situation eventually changed with the establishment of the 
Special Forces Assessment and Selection (SFAS) program in the summer of 1988 and its 
subsequent recruiting component, the Special Operations Recruiting Company 
(SORC).174  
SF soldiers must be mature, capable of working well with different types of 
people, and adept at understanding the cultural dynamics of a particular location to 
identify exploitable opportunities. At the same time, they needed to operate with minimal 
guidance. Whereas the OSS had over 3 million conscripts from which to screen, the 
nature of the all-volunteer force of today presents challenges for finding qualified men, 
let alone the most talented men for SF. The aspiration to attend college has cut the 
number of men interested in the Army.175 This trend has been building for decades. More 
surprising is that only 1.9 million out of the country’s 30.8 million 17–24 year olds are 
even qualified to join the Army.176 By comparison, roughly three out of four young men 
qualified for service in the U.S. Army in fiscal year 1981.177  
The U.S. Army Special Forces Regiment is a male-only, triple volunteer 
organization. A potential recruit must first volunteer for the U.S. Army, then volunteer to 
complete airborne training, and finally, volunteer to attend SF training. There are four 
                                                 
172 Sutherland, Special Forces of the United States Army, 131.  
173 Beckwith and Knox, Delta Force, 18.  
174 The SORC would later become a battalion and renamed the SORB in 2006. 
175 Donald Vandergriff, Manning the Future Legions of the United States (Westport, CT: Praeger 
Security International, 2008), 115. 
176 Ibid., 116. This number includes for both men and women and most are unable to serve due to 
physical, psychological, educational, or legal disqualifications.  
177 Eitelberg et al., Screening for Service: Aptitude and Education Criteria for Military Entry, 79. 
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primary paths by which male volunteers can join Special Forces (Figure 5).178 First, 
potential candidates can join the active duty U.S. Army. After an initial Army assignment 
and after earning the rank of Specialist (or First Lieutenant promotable for officers), they 
can then volunteer to attend Special Forces Assessment and Selection (SFAS). SFAS has 
varied in length over the years, but remains an extremely physically challenging course 
with more than half of all volunteers failing.179 If a volunteer successfully completes 
SFAS, he must then finish all of the required AF training that can take from one to two 
years, depending on his military occupational specialty (MOS).180  
The second method of joining SF is for citizens with no previous military 
experience to enlist for a Special Forces Candidate contract in the 18X program at a 
regular Army recruiting station. The 18X program (pronounced 18-Xray) was originally 
established in 1990 to authorize qualified prior service soldiers who had separated from 
any of the armed services to become eligible to reenlist into SF pending successful 
completion of SFAS. The 18X program was reintroduced in 2002 for qualified male 
citizens with no previous military experience to apply for SF after completing basic 
training, advanced infantry training, and airborne school.  
Alternatively, a volunteer can enlist in the National Guard and then join a 






                                                 
178 For a description of the process involved in volunteering for SFAS and completing SF training, see 
Dick Couch, Chosen Soldier (New York: Crown Publishers, 2007). 
179 In 2008, the SFAS course was altered from 24 days to 14 days to allow more SFAS classes per 
year. Consequently, the success rate was dramatically reduced and injuries increased. It was subsequently 
bumped back to 19 days in 2009.  
180 SF has eight MOS positions: 18A–Officer, 180A–Warrant Officer, 18B–Weapons Sergeant, 18C–
Engineer Sergeant, 18D–Medical Sergeant, 18E–Communications Sergeant, 18F–Intelligence Sergeant, 
18Z–Senior NCO. Only five are open to new SF recruits: 18A, 18B, 18C, 18D, 18E.  
 56 
percent (8,425 men) of today’s Special Forces Regiment is on active duty.181 The 
remaining 16% (1,627 men) serve in the Army National Guard, who are dispersed 
throughout the continental United States as SF companies.182  
 
 
Figure 5.   Different mechanisms exist for attending SFAS although active duty 
recruitment by the SORB and the 18X program is by far the most 
significant.  
 
                                                 
181 Data provided to the author by the Defense Manpower Data Center located in Fort Ord, CA in 
March 2011.  
182 19th SFG(A) and 20th SFG(A) are the two National Guard Special Forces units and have the 
following units and locations: A/1/20th SFG(A) in Auburn, AL; HQ/20th SFG(A) in Birmingham, AL; 
B/1/20th SFG(A) in Mobile, AL; HQ/1/20th SFG(A) in Huntsville, AL; HQ/2/20th SFG(A) in Jackson, 
MS; C/2/20th SFG(A) in Grenada, MS; A/2/20th SFG(A) in Chicago, IL; B/2/20th SFG(A) in Glen Arm, 
MD; B/3/20th SFG(A) in Roanoke Rapids, NC; C/1/20th SFG(A) in Springfield, MA; A/3/20th SFG(A) in 
Ocala, FL; C/3/20th SFG(A) in Wauchula, FL; HQ/19th SFG(A) in Draper, UT; HQ/1/19th SFG(A) in 
Riverton, UT; A/5/19th SFG(A) in Los Alamitos, CA; A/1/19th SFG(A) in Buckley, WA; B/5/19th 
SFG(A) in Fort Carson, CO; HQ/5/19th SFG(A) in Watkins, CO; C/5/19th SFG (A) in San Antonio, TX; 
B/2/19th SFG (A) in Columbus, OH; HQ/2/19th SFG(A) in Kenova, WV; C/2/19th SFG(A) in Kingwood, 
WV; A/2/19th SFG(A) in Middletown, RI; C/1/19th SFG(A) in San Antonio, TX; units and location listed 
at http://www.nationalguard.com/careers/special-forces/special-forces-unit-finder.  
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Finally, a limited avenue is available for non-Army military volunteers. Service 
members in other military branches may transfer into the Army and attend SFAS. For 
example, a limited number of active duty is Navy, Air Force, and Marine Corps officers 
authorized to complete a branch transfer into SF, but this move requires an extensive 
approval process before the officer can be admitted to attend SFAS.183  
Legal non-citizens can join the Army under the Military Accessions to National 
Interest (MAVNI) program.184 While not a special pathway directly into SF, MAVNI 
opens up a potentially critical market for native foreign language speakers. MAVNI 
volunteers can volunteer for SF either through an 18X contract when they join or after 
meeting the prerequisites for all active duty Army soldiers.  
Today, the main criteria for screening potential SF enlisted candidates are the 
same requirements used for all potential Army recruits, education and aptitude. All SF 
volunteers must be high school graduates with a GED, with a diploma, or with some 
higher education. Aptitude is evaluated using scores from the Armed Services Vocational 
Aptitude Battery (ASVAB), which covers nine different multiple-choice topics. The 
General Technical, or GT, score from the ASVAB serves as a screen.185 The minimum 
GT score for SF was increased from 100 to 107 in 2009.186 A limited number of waivers 
are available for recruits scoring between 100 and 107. Any soldier who scores below  
 
 
                                                 
183 The U.S. Army Research Institute for the Behavioral and Social Sciences found that prior service 
Air Force and Navy volunteers previously separated from the military performed well at SFAS; see 
Elizabeth J. Brady and Judith E. Brooks from the U.S. Army Research Institute for the Behavioral and 
Social Sciences and their published Research Report 1646 in October of 1993 entitled ―Prior Service 
Soldiers in the Special Forces Assessment and Selection Program: Recruitment Issues.‖ 
184 MAVNI information can be found at http://www.defense.gov/news/mavni-fact-sheet.pdf. 
185 The GT score is composed of two components, the Verbal Expression (VE) and Arithmetic 
Reasoning (AR). The verbal expression is a combination of two different components tests, the Paragraph 
Comprehension (PC) and Word Knowledge (WK) sections. The WK measures one’s ability to select the 
correct meaning of a word presented in context and to identify the best synonym for a given word. The PC 
measures the recruit’s ability to obtain information from written passages. These two tests are combined 
with the Arithmetic Reasoning (AR) to form a complete GT score. The AR measures the ability to solve 
arithmetic word problems; for more info, see http://www.official-asvab.com/docs/asvab_fact_sheet.pdf.  
186 When the GT score was changed from 100 to 107, several SORB recruiters approached the 
leadership within some of the active duty SF groups to show them which current operators would no longer 
qualify to try out for SF. As it turns out, many highly respected and proven operators fell into this category. 
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107 can voluntarily attend a GT score improvement program, which usually increases a 
soldier’s GT score.187 Beyond needing the minimum GT score, a minimum score of 240 
is required on the Army Physical Fitness Test (APFT).  
A.  RECRUITERS 
Active duty SF recruitment is conducted by two different organizations within the 
U.S. Army Recruiting Command (USAREC). USAREC is interested and, in fact, 
evaluated on its ability to recruit a specified quantity of qualified personnel. Considering 
that it is the sole manpower generator for an all-volunteer Army exceeding 550,000 
active duty soldiers, this is a logical mission. In contrast, the SF are more concerned with 
the quality of any potential recruits. A cursory glance at four of the five SOF truths, 
axioms routinely posted in any SOF headquarters, reveals a significant focus on the 
individual: 
 Humans are more important than hardware 
 Quality is better than quantity  
 Special Operations Forces cannot be mass produced  
 Competent Special Operations Forces cannot be created after emergencies 
occur188 
Ironically, only two organizations can recruit men to try out for SF, and neither 
works for USASOC or SOCOM. The first recruiting unit is the Special Operations 
Recruiting Battalion (SORB), which recruits all active duty soldiers for attendance at 
SFAS. In reality, the SORB recruits nearly all of the active duty Army SOF, including 
SF, Civil Affairs, Psychological Operations, and the Special Operations Aviation 
Regiment (SOAR).189 These recruiters are responsible for providing the largest amount 
of personnel who attend SFAS each year. The second organization that recruits for SF is 
the Army’s normal recruiting brigades.  
                                                 
187 Each Army post runs a Basic Skills Education Program (BSEP), while other completely online 
websites exist to help improve GT scores for interested soldiers, see www.march2success.com.  
188 SOF truths found on the official USASOC webpage; see 
http://www.soc.mil/USASOC%20Headquarters/SOF%20Truths.html.  
189 Although not part of Army SOF, the SORB also recruits for Explosive Ordinance Disposal (EOD). 
In addition, it was charged in late 2009 with recruiting for all Army Warrant Officers, another non-SOF 
recruiting mission. Surprisingly, the SORB does not recruit for Ranger Regiment.  
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1. The Special Operations Recruiting Battalion (SORB) 
Headquartered at Fort Bragg, NC, the SORB is distributed into several small 
recruiting teams across the continental United States, with additional teams in Hawaii and 
Germany. Most of these recruiting teams consist of three recruiters, usually with one 
qualified 18-series NCO recruiter. The teams are controlled by regionally aligned 
recruiting companies, which are commanded by SF officers. While most of the recruiters 
in the SORB are not SF qualified, the SORB is selective about which recruiters can join 
it; new recruiters are required to attend a challenging orientation program advised by 
SFAS cadre to help them understand what recruits will experience at SFAS. The non-SF 
qualified recruiters in the SORB are considered some of the best recruiters within 
USAREC. However, the SORB is authorized only a limited number of SF qualified 
NCOs and officers, which, in turn, limits the number of interactions between interested 
recruits and SF qualified recruiters.  
The leadership of each Special Forces Group must approve a SF qualified 
recruiter before the SORB interviews that individual. Historically, many of the SF NCOs 
assigned to the SORB were injured, operationally fatigued, or had family issues that 
made them excellent candidates for assignment. While these issues sometimes led to less 
fitting SF NCOs ending up at the SORB, recent efforts by the SORB have made 
recruiting assignments more selective. Still, most members in the SF community do not 
view assignment to recruiting duty as a high priority, not even when it is for recruitment 
for SF.  
A SORB recruiter has two jobs, recruit soldiers who will volunteer for SFAS, and 
facilitate their attendance. Recruiters routinely interact with company, battalion, and 
brigade level leadership to contact all eligible soldiers about joining SF In addition, the 
SORB battalion leadership regularly interfaces at higher command levels, such as with 
the Eighth U.S. Army (EUSA) in Korea. SORB recruiters habitually visit individual units 
and high traffic areas (PXs and gyms), while constantly e-mailing eligible soldiers about 
opportunities within SF. In addition, the SORB conducts SOF career fairs at different 
Army installations after units redeploy, including at OCONUS locations.  
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The driving force behind the SORB, as with all USAREC controlled units, is its 
recruiting mission, namely, the number of active duty enlisted soldiers it must recruit for 
attendance to SFAS. This recruitment represents a joint agreement between USAREC 
and the U.S. Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School 
(USAJFKSWCS), which is the entity that conducts SFAS. Recent SORB annual missions 
have required at or near 2,000 active duty enlisted soldiers to attend SFAS. Meanwhile, 
interested officers submit their file through the SORB to an annual board that selects 
officers for attendance to SFAS. Before they even attend SFAS in 2011, nearly 600 
officers competed for only about 300 officer slots at SFAS.190 Thus, unlike enlisted 
soldiers, officer candidates are selected ―in‖ before they even attend SFAS. 
2. Non-Prior Service (NPS) Recruiters  
Interested civilians can join SF by contacting an Army recruiter at an Army 
recruiting station. Army recruiters enlist non-prior service (NPS) civilians for service in 
the Army.191 USAREC has seven recruiting brigades consisting of 9,500 soldiers 
distributed globally across 1,400 recruiting stations. The individual recruiting stations are 
the first step for an interested civilian to try out for SF. These recruiters enlist interested 
male civilians if they meet the following criteria from Army Regulation 614-100: 
 20–29 years old by departure date for Infantry One Station Unit Training 
(OSUT)192  
 Qualified and volunteer for airborne training 
 U.S. citizen 
 Min ASVAB scores of 107 general technical (GT) and 98 combat 
operation (CO) 
 High School Diploma  
 Eligible for a SECRET clearance 
 Medically qualified for Special Forces training 
                                                 
190 Estimated FY2011 Army Special Operations Forces (ARSOF) Selection Board, which selects 
officers for training in Special Forces, Civil Affairs, or PSYOPs.  
191 NPS, or Non-Prior Service, is Army recruiting lexicon for civilians with no previous military 
experience.  
192 Infantry One Station Unit Training (OSUT) is a combination of Basic Combat Training and 
Advanced Individual Training (AIT) for infantry, followed by airborne school. 
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 Complete the Defense Language Aptitude Battery (DLAB) with a 
minimum score of 70 or a Defense Language Proficiency Test (DLPT) 
with a minimum of 1/1 reading and listening score 
 Achieve an APFT score of 240 with a minimum of 60 points in each event 
using the standards for age group 17–21. 
B.  RECRUITMENT PROCESS 
To modify one of Clausewitz’s famous aphorisms, attending SFAS is simple, but 
the simplest thing is difficult. Active-duty soldiers often face retribution from their 
leadership just for contacting a SF recruiter.193 Once a soldier decides to try out for SF, 
the process involves attending a standard SF briefing, completing an administrative 
packet, receiving a physical examination, and completing an Army physical fitness test 
administered by a SORB recruiter. Once his packet is complete, the volunteer coordinates 
for an available SFAS class to attend. Once approved, the candidate receives orders and 
flies to Fort Bragg for his SFAS class.  
In contrast, 18X candidates must successfully complete infantry OSUT and 
airborne training. Next, he attends the Special Operations Preparatory & Conditioning 
(SOPC) course at Fort Bragg, NC. SOPC provides these relatively new recruits with 
basic soldiering skills and begins to inculcate the institutional culture of the Army and 
SF. Excluding their basic training and airborne school, recruits in the 18X program often 
lack any familiarity with the military and the SOPC course is designed to prepare them to 
complete SFAS successfully. It lasts two weeks and consists of physical conditioning, 
land navigation, and small unit team building. Once soldiers complete SOPC, they are 
then scheduled for SFAS.  
                                                 
193 The author observed this issue as a SF recruiting company commander for 18 months. Often, the 
officers and senior NCOs in the chain of command of an interested candidate would make it difficult for a 
volunteer to train or attend SFAS or they would threaten extreme, but legal, treatment if the volunteer failed 
SFAS and returned to the unit. This retribution sometimes served as motivation to not quit and perform 
well during SFAS. It is also important to note many commands were supportive. Ultimately, the 
unsupportive reactions by some commands towards interested candidates were usually the result of 
personal feelings by the leadership towards the Special Forces Regiment overall and not indicative of any 
specific organization. 
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C. SPECIAL FORCES ASSESSMENT AND SELECTION (SFAS) 
During the infancy of SF, to earn SF qualification, it was only necessary to 
complete a training course along with a specified number of UW exercises and service in 
an operational unit; many soldiers were simply assigned to a SF unit.194 While the 
Special Forces Qualification Course (SFQC) was developed to teach candidates the 
required skills for conducting UW missions, no selection process existed to access 
volunteers, which changed in June 1988 when the first Special Forces Orientation and 
Training (SFOT) class was conducted at Camp Mackall, NC. This class was based 
largely on the British SAS selection process, which actually was not institutionalized 
until the 1950s. SFOT’s genesis began in the mid-1980s when BG James Guest and COL 
Richard Potter concluded that SF needed a selection process. COL Potter persuaded the 
Army staff to approve SFOT by highlighting the savings and combat readiness associated 
with a dedicated selection and assessment program. Using research data about desirable 
traits in a SF soldier along with insights from individuals who had previously attended 
the Australian SAS selection course, SFOT took 14 months to coordinate. After 
consulting with several other SOF organizations, including the British SAS, SFOT earned 
validation in the spring of 1988. For the first year, SFOT ran nine classes with 
approximately 190 volunteers each. In June 1989, the name SFOT changed to Special 
Forces Assessment and Selection (SFAS).195  
While SFAS varied in its events, their sequence, and the duration of the course 
(between 14–24 days), its purpose has remained relatively unchanged. By evaluating 
specific attributes considered universally essential for SF soldiers (intelligence, 
trainability, physical fitness, motivation, influence, and judgment), SFAS selects 
candidates that it believes will be able to complete the SFQC. All candidates undergo 
different forms of physical and mental stress. Candidates endure a variety of assessments, 
including an Army APFT, obstacle courses, log drills, rifle PT, long distance runs, 
ruckmarches, military orienteering, Minnesota Multifacet Personality Inventory (MMPI), 
                                                 
194 Sutherland, Special Forces of the United States Army, 131.  
195 Most of the history of SFAS was taken from an article written by James L. Velky who was one of 
the project officers for the establishment of SFAS; see ―Special Forces Assessment and Selection,‖ Special 
Warfare 3, no. 1 (1990): 12–15, http://www.soc.mil/swcs/swmag/90win.pdf.  
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the Wonderlic Personnel Intelligence Test (WPIT), and the 16 Personality Factor Test 
(16PF).196 SFAS assesses each candidate through behavioral observation and 
performance measures. All assessments are performed in a neutral environment with 
limited information offered, no performance feedback, and minimal harassment. Upon 
successful completion of SFAS, a soldier is considered ―selected‖ and is scheduled to 
return to Fort Bragg and attend the SFQC (and airborne school if needed).  
D. TODAY’S ACTIVE-DUTY SFAS CANDIDATE197 
Although no duty restrictions within the Army exist for qualified male soldiers,198 
SF often attracts combat arms soldiers disproportionately.199 This fact is clearly 
illustrated by the success rates of combat arms and noncombat arms candidates in SFAS. 
Between 1995 and 2009, 24,969 active duty enlisted men volunteered for SFAS; 54% 
(13,716) came from combat arms branches. Overall, only 8,888 men successfully 
completed SFAS. Combat arms soldiers had a 41.6% success rate while non-combat arms 
had a 28.2% success rate (Figure 6).  
                                                 
196 USAREC Pamphlet 601-25 14 NOV 06. 
197 All data used for SFAS candidate analysis were SORB data available to the author while he served 
as Commander, C Co, Special Operations Recruiting Battalion (SORB) from 2008–2009.  
198 Current qualifications for active-duty enlisted men to attend SFAS include rank between E–4 and 
E–7, GT score of 107, APFT score of 240 or greater, pass a SF physical exam, be eligible for a secret 
clearance, be a U.S. citizen, volunteer for airborne training, and have no serious administrative punishments 
in his record. For active-duty officers, they must have a rank of First Lieutenant or Captain, DLAB score of 
85 or higher, APFT score of 240 or greater, pass a SF physical exam, have a secret clearance, be a U.S. 
citizen, and volunteer for airborne training.  
199 For official definitions of combat arms, combat support, and combat service support, see Army 
Regulation 600–82, ―The U.S. Army Regimental System,‖ June 5, 1990; Combat Arms included the Army 
branches of Infantry, Armor, Cavalry, Field Artillery, Engineer, Aviation, Air Defense Artillery, and 
Special Forces. In 2008, the Army reorganized Combat Arms, Combat Support and Combat Service 
Support into Maneuver, Fires, and Effects (MFE), Operations Support Division (OSD), and Force 
Sustainment Division (FSD).  
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Figure 6.   SFAS Selection Rate (±1 Standard Error) for Different active duty Army 
Populations from 1995-2009.  
The success rate at SFAS has averaged 36% over the past 15 years. The profile 
for active-duty enlisted soldiers who successfully completed SFAS was the following: 
71% were Ranger School qualified, 49% were from the Infantry, and 46% were from an 
airborne unit. In addition to a mean Army Physical Fitness Test (APFT) score of 263, an 
ASVAB General Technical (GT) score of 115, and five years of prior service in the 
Army, the successful SFAS candidate was, on average, 26 years old.  
E. SFAS AND UW TALENT 
SFAS has assessed thousands of potential candidates, both officer and enlisted, 
since its inception in 1988. While previous chapters detailed the challenge inherent in 
predicting human behavior in UW operations—and the consequences of not doing so—
SFAS is effective at measuring the motivation and adaptability of SF recruits. In fact, just 
considering applying for SFAS tests a soldier’s motivation. Many commanders believe 
that SF lure away their best soldiers, by ―skimming off the cream‖ from the conventional 
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units, and depleting the larger Army for the good of a small unit.200 The consequence is 
that a volunteer is already demonstrating a certain degree of courage attempting to join 
the SF. Many business models, including the attraction-selection-attrition (ASA) model, 
underscore the fundamental tenet that people self-select into and out of organizations.201 
While not all Army soldiers walking into a SORB recruiting station say they have always 
wanted to be a Green Beret, this scene is not uncommon. Individuals tend to associate 
with others who are similar to them in one or more ways. This similarity helps explain 
soldiers who follow a professional mentor or peer they view as a competent soldier into 
SF. The very desire to do a particular job is what business theory deems a ―motivational 
fit.‖202 Thus, SFAS can make use of both intended and unintended measures of 
motivation, from a candidate simply asking a recruiter how to join SF to a candidate 
actually completing the physically demanding events during SFAS.  
SFAS also makes use of assessment activities that test a candidate’s adaptability 
in ambiguous scenarios. By assessing a recruit’s mental, interpersonal, and physical 
adaptability, SFAS continually tests whether a recruit can adjust to a continuously 








                                                 
200 For a detailed look at the effects elite units ―skimming off the cream‖ from conventional forces, 
see Chapter 3, ―The Military and Political Costs of Elite Units‖ of Eliot A. Cohen, Commandos and 
Politicians (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Center for International Affairs, 1978), 56–58.  
201 Sally A. Carless, ―Person–job Fit Versus Person–Organization Fit As Predictors of Organizational 
Attraction and Job Acceptance Intentions: A Longitudinal Study,‖ Journal of Occupational and 
Organizational Psychology 78 (2005): 412.  
202 Kevin C. Klinvex, Christopher P. Klinvex, and Matthew S. O'Connell, Hiring Great People (New 
York: McGraw-Hill Companies Inc., 1998), 119–120. The authors describe ―motivational fit‖ as the level 
of alignment or agreement between what a person expects or wishes to receive from a job and what the job 
can actually offer.  
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easily testable traits during SFAS. Numerous tests have indicated that the primary 
predictor of success is the APFT score, along with the first ruckmarch, psychological 
hardiness, and the ASVAB score.203  
None of these different indicators of SFAS success assesses any significant 
aptitude for cross-cultural work or determines whether an individual has interpersonal 
intelligence. In fact, it is rare to find either of these cited as a cause for failure at SFAS. 
While it can be argued that interpersonal intelligence is measured to a certain extent 
during the teamwork portion of SFAS, rarely are soldiers dropped from SFAS or the 
SFQC for a lack of teamwork. With respect to a lack of concern about cross-cultural 
capability, this result is likely due to the belief that language training during a later phase 
in the SFQC is the key to improving cross-cultural skills. This view is widely held even 
in academia, despite the lack of any empirical evidence to support this conclusion. 
Results indicate that language training does not produce more positive feelings toward 
other cultures and ethnic groups. Additionally, language proficiency has little positive 
effect on adjusting to and building interpersonal relationships in a foreign culture.204 To 
summarize, SFAS actively measures a recruit’s motivation and adaptability; it would be 
better if more men who possess interpersonal intelligence and an aptitude for cross-
cultural work were recruited in. SFAS would still be ideal for assessing their motivation 
and adaptability for SF. However, front loading the selection process could help produce 
even more talented UW soldiers. 
                                                 
203 For analysis of the ASVAB and APFT score, see Michelle Zazanis, Gary A. Hazlett, Robert N. 
Kilcullen, and Michael G. Sanders, ―Prescreening Methods for Special Forces Assessment and Selection,‖ 
U.S. Army Research Institute for the Behavioral and Social Sciences, Technical Report 1094, May 1999; 
for analysis of APFT score and the first ruckmarch, see Martha L. Teplitzky, ―Success in Special Forces 
Assessment and Selection,‖ U.S. Army Research Institute for the Behavioral and Social Sciences, Research 
Report 1606, November 1991; for analysis of psychological hardiness, which was defined as a 
―psychological style associated with resilience, good health, and performance under a range of stressful 
conditions,‖ see Paul T. Bartone, Robert R. Roland, James J. Picano, and Thomas J. Williams, 
―Psychological Hardiness Predicts Success in U.S. Army Special Forces Candidates,‖ International 
Journal of Selection and Assessment 16, no. 1 (2008): 78–81.  
204 Allison Abbe, ―Transfer and Generalizability of Foreign Language Learning,‖ U.S. Army Research 
Institute for the Behavioral and Social Sciences Study Report 2008-06, February 2009, 1–10.  
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V.  RECOMMENDATIONS AND CONCLUSION 
The following recommendations draw an analysis from the previous chapters, as 
well as from this author’s own experiences as a SF recruiter for 18 months. These 
conclusions are not prescriptive, but recommend ideas about where to find talented men 
for SF. The suggestion is not to stop the current recruiting process. In fact, SF have 
accomplished significant strategic effects in many countries using the active duty Army 
as its principal recruitment pool. As the U.S. military shrinks and the fitness for military 
service of America’s youth drops, the Special Forces Regiment needs to broaden the 
source populations from which it recruits to improve the short and long-term health of the 
regiment. With recruiter reorganization, a referral program, accurate advertising, long-
term engagement strategy, and renewed leader involvement, targeted recruitment for 
interpersonal intelligence and cross-cultural capability could help achieve for SF what 
NASA achieved during its assessment and selection for the Mercury astronauts: 
It was not to separate tigers from bunnies; there just weren’t any bunnies 
… when the physical, intelligence, and psychological records of each of 
the thirty-two men were analyzed the doctors found an ―embarrassment of 
riches…we couldn’t have made a mistake if we had taken any seven of the 
thirty-two, the differences were so slight.205  
A. TARGETED RECRUITMENT 
Traditional recruitment efforts for SF involve face-to-face contact with soldiers at 
their active duty unit. E-mail contacts are made to all eligible soldiers by a recruiter. 
Recruiters travel to different military installations to speak with interested candidates on 
trips that can last days to weeks. Also, the SORB routinely conducts career fairs on larger 
military installations. In short, the small numbers of SORB recruiters already routinely 
saturate the markets available within the active duty Army. However, significant markets 
remain untapped.  
                                                 
205 Martin Caidin, The Astronauts: The Story of Project Mercury, America’s Man-in-Space Program 
(New York: Dutton & Co., Inc, 1960), 85–88.  
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The 18X program could become a windfall for SF. It opens up the entire civilian 
population under the age of 30. Unfortunately, current NPS recruiters have no incentive 
to recruit specifically for SF and are unlikely to possess sufficient institutional knowledge 
about SF. For a more robust 18X program, an OSS-like recruitment effort could be 
designed to draw a variety of recruits from across all career fields and industries to both 
attract and identify those with the best traits. SFAS could still measure the motivation and 
adaptability of each recruit, but the UW ―starting material‖ for these potential operators 
would be significantly higher. Imagine the UW potential of a first generation American 
from Africa or South America who is recruited from a previous sales job in which he 
spent years influencing others to buy things he wanted them to buy. If additional 
recruiters were added to the SORB to aid in recruitment of civilians for SF, the regiment 
could target marketing, sales, service industries, or academia in which interpersonal 
intelligence and cross-cultural capability are vital.  
While it may seem that few civilians would be interested in joining SF during a 
recruiting assignment, this writer discovered that many soldiers were passively 
considering joining SF. Although some soldiers always knew they wanted to join SF, 
others did not know until the opportunity presented itself. In fact, recruitment efforts in 
general often target those not looking for a change. Surveys over three years in the 
business industry reveal that two thirds of managers who switched jobs did so because a 
better offer came their way, not because they were looking; many people, in fact, are 
passive job seekers.206  
Over the past 60 years, the threat environment for the United States has shifted 
from Europe to Asia and Africa. The Soviet threat in Eastern Europe has given way to 
conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan, while major flashpoints remain throughout Africa and 
Asia. Racial and ethnic minorities are almost universally underrepresented within SF 
when compared to the potential applicant pool of males within the Army and National 
Guard overall, which is especially true for blacks. While the Special Forces Regiment 
was formed using non-citizen refugees in the 1950s, today’s regiment has very few first-
                                                 
206 Michaels, Handfield-Jones, and Axelrod, The War for Talent, 83. 
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generation Americans (<5%). Of those foreign born, most were born in countries with a 
U.S. military garrison: Germany, Korea, and Puerto Rico. Notably, the regiment has 
almost no foreign born men from either Africa or South America. 
Recruiting individuals already familiar with a language or another culture would 
be extremely beneficial. In fact, this process formed the first SF units. Specifically 
targeting first and second generation Americans, as well as foreign nationals, provides an 
additional opportunity to find recruits most capable of working with foreign 
populations.207 SF personnel deployed abroad could potentially serve as recruitment 
aides, which could attract foreign nationals with the proper credentials. Many foreign 
nationals speak multiple languages, and bilingualism appears to assist in adapting to 
different cross-cultural situations.208 The Army recently established the MAVNI program 
to recruit foreign professionals for service in the Army, and some SF groups have begun 
to utilize this asset. However, the program needs to be expanded; it is not providing 
significant numbers of foreign nationals to the SF. Finding multi-lingual recruiters who 
can break into the first and second generations American market would also prove 
extremely valuable. Recruitment in locations that contain different ethnic and racial 
diasporas may help find a diverse group of capable UW warriors.  
The other military services offer another potential recruiting pool. If the SF are 
willing to enlist civilians with no previous military experience, opening up recruitment to 
members of other services would yield recruits with some previous military experience 
and, possibly, extensive combat experience in a joint environment. Marines interested in 
joining SF have contacted recruiters before, but no current policy exists to tap into this 
potentially large recruitment pool. While such a transfer might be considered stealing 
personnel by the other services, agreements could be made that the SORB would only 
reach out to Marines and others at the end of their enlistment. Also, the numbers of 
servicemen joining SF would likely be small. For example, two U.S. Coast Guardsmen 
                                                 
207 For an entire thesis on this subject, see Trevor O. Robichaux, ―Special Forces Recruiting: The 
Operational Need for Targeted Recruitment of First and Second Generation Americans‖ (Master’s thesis, 
Naval Postgraduate School, December 2008).  
208 Abbe, ―Transfer and Generalizability of Foreign Language Learning,‖ 13. 
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recently became the first non-Navy SEALs to complete SQT.209 As it is, other services 
might be forced to reduce their manning requirements in certain years as their military 
budgets are reduced. As these recruits could not return to their previous service once 
transferred into the Army, they would likely remain highly motivated to complete SFAS. 
All these factors make opening up SF to the other services worth considering.  
B. RECRUITER REORGANIZATION 
This thesis was not designed to offer a detailed organizational redesign of the 
SORB. However, the experiences of this author while in the unit and through 
conversations with members in the SORB point to some general concerns. First, the 
SORB should be reorganized under the command of USASOC where it can answer 
directly to the commander of the units for which it recruits. This move would enable it to 
respond quickly to emerging requirements, such as the all-female mission to fill the 
Cultural Support Teams (CST) for USASOC.210 Currently, USAREC’s Medical 
Recruiting Brigade commands the SORB; in addition to controlling SF recruiting, this 
brigade also manages Chaplain recruiting. While USAREC’s Medical Recruiting Brigade 
is a capable recruiting organization for the medical profession, it is not designed to 
address the unique recruiting needs of SF. Under USAREC, the SORB will always be 
commanded by an organization that values quantity over quality. One way to resolve this 
situation in SFs’ favor is to assign the SORB to USASOC.  
Secondly, the SORB should be manned with additional 18-series NCOs, and it 
should assume the 18X recruitment mission. How this manning could be accomplished is 
beyond the scope of this thesis, but the lack of incentive to recruit specifically for SF, as 
well as the lack of detailed knowledge about SF among current NPS recruiters, hurts 
recruiting prospects for SF. If the regiment has been able to grow its overall strength by 
roughly an entire SF group (five battalions) over the past few years, it can surely afford to 
                                                 
209 The two Coast Guardsmen attended SQT as part of an agreement between the Coast Guard, Navy, 
and SOCOM to integrate a small group of Coast Guardsman each year into SQT; see NSWC Public 
Affairs, ―Joining the Ranks,‖ Ethos 9 (2011): 2.  
210 CSTs are ―all-female soldier teams who serve as enablers supporting Army Special Operations 
combat forces in, and around secured objective areas.‖ For more information on the Cultural Support 
Teams, see http://www.soc.mil/CST/CST.html. 
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provide additional manpower in its recruitment effort. Most importantly, the SF 
recruiting job needs to be considered an important position within the SF community. 
Since recruiters in this job routinely interact with Brigade and Corps leadership, these 
interactions could be used to improve the relationship between the conventional Army 
and SF.  
A candidate who approaches the Non-Prior-Service (NPS) recruiter with interest 
in the 18X program may find little information or knowledge about SF at the recruiting 
station. Most of the time, a potential recruit is given a pamphlet, video, or other 
distributable media with a brief description about SF missions. Since the NPS recruiter is 
not evaluated on the number of recruits enlisted for a particular specialty, such as SF, the 
recruiter is much more likely to speak highly about familiar topics. Nor do recruiters have 
any particular incentive to recruit for the 18X program. Unfortunately, the SF candidate 
must self-select before visiting the recruiting station.  
C. REFERRAL PROGRAM 
One of the oldest recruiting methods in business is still the most effective: 
personal referrals. This technique was employed by the OSS with limited success because 
no thoughtfully conceived and well-implemented referral program existed.211 Instead, 
those in the OSS tended just to hire family and friends. Nearly 40% of over 5,000 
business managers surveyed in 1997 were hired from personal contacts. Although recruits 
referred by employees are often very successful, few organizations take a deliberate or 
organized approach to tapping into current employee networks. In the competitive 
environment of today, every SF soldier should be a talent scout.212  
A simple tool, like an online system or mailable business card, could help SF 
soldiers in the field refer potentially competent individuals to recruiters. Critical to a 
referral program is creating an effective tracking system. Without it, individuals can 
simply refer friends. In business, poorly run referral systems severely affect 
                                                 
211 Christopher W. Pritchard, 101 Strategies for Recruiting Success: Where, When, and How to Find 
the Right People Every Time (New York: AMACOM Books, 2006), 55–56 and Diane Arthur, Recruiting, 
Interviewing, Selecting and Orienting New Employees (New York: AMACOM Books, 2005), 38. 
212 Michaels, Handfield-Jones, and Axelrod, The War for Talent, 86–88. 
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organizational morale. Still, informal recruiting yields greater proportions of high-
performing and more stable employees than formal recruiting sources.213 SF should 
strive for quality referrals only.214 
D. ACCURATE ADVERTISING 
Most SF advertising fails to portray accurately the Green Berets’ primary mission. 
The widespread use of ―commando‖ images in SF advertising contradicts the less 
dramatic but no less important mission of working by, with, and through indigenous 
forces. While SF soldiers do conduct direct action operations and have to be adept at 
airborne or SCUBA infiltration techniques, any SF advertising campaign should focus on 
SF teams working with indigenous personnel, even if considered by some to be less 
exciting.215 Indeed, being more accurate might actually help reduce the number of thrill-
seeking men who volunteer for SF only to find they lack cross-cultural capability or 
simply dislike working with foreigners. Other UW units have similarly experienced truth-
in-advertising challenges.  
For example, the secrecy that shrouded OSS missions hindered the posting of job 
descriptions, which created a bias toward men intrigued by secret missions. Covert 
overseas missions seemed especially attractive to men who were ―bored, pathologically 
adventurous, attracted to danger, or just plain psychopaths.‖216 Navy SEALs, meanwhile, 
have traditionally been used as maritime commandos and accordingly have focused their 
recruitment on exceptionally fit men, not men with cross-cultural capability. Yet, 
SOCOM is increasingly assigning SEALs the UW mission. A quick glance at the 
NSWRD website, www.sealswcc.com, will not produce images of SEALs working with 
local forces. Consequently, as SEALs are called on to conduct UW missions, ―their skills 
                                                 
213 Robert N. McMurry, ―Man Hunt for Top Executives,‖ Harvard Business Review, 46–62. 
214 For earlier analysis on the use of referrals in SF recruitment, see Steven M. Swierkowski and 
Robert M. Burrell, ―Tactics, Methods, and Techniques to Improve Special Forces In-service Enlisted 
Recruiting‖ (Master’s thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, June 2002).  
215 The author was guilty of this tactic while serving in the SORB. Rarely did the author choose to use 
the less exciting images of working with foreign forces for most of the advertising products.  
216 Donald W. Mackinnon, ―How Assessment Centers were started in the United States: the OSS 
Assessment Program,‖ Studies in Intelligence 23, no. 3 (1979): 25. 
http://www.ddiworld.com/pdf/ddi_howassessmentcenterswerestarted_mg.pdf.  
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and training are not directly aligned with such action.‖217 Learning from these examples, 
the more truthful the advertising campaign, the more of the right kind of recruits SF 
should be able to attract. SF should project advertising that depicts Green Berets working 
with indigenous personnel.  
E. LONG-TERM ENGAGEMENT STRATEGY 
The Special Forces Regiment should consider developing a long-term recruitment 
strategy that engages young males at an early age with a goal to increase their awareness 
about SF. The U.S. Navy SEALs have deliberately planned ways to engage male youth; 
why should not SF do the same? A long-range engagement strategy would also be the 
critical component to increasing minority numbers within SF. Most research into why 
minorities avoid joining SOF indicates a perceived barrier to joining. Recruitment may 
help to reduce these barriers. Surveyed minorities indicate that many were unaware of 
SOF before joining the military. By comparison, a large percentage of current SOF 
members, to include SF, revealed a long-standing desire to join SOF usually developed 
when very young; many grew up idolizing SOF units. In addition, a number of 
influencers (parents, grandparents, coaches, and teachers) in minority communities are 
uninformed about SOF and hesitant to recommend a career in the military, which is 
compounded by the lack of minority role models within SOF. SF was considered a white 
organization by several minorities who spoke with this writer when he was a SF recruiter, 
and this perception reinforced their lack of interest in joining. Thus, any long-term 
engagement plan must also consider race when attempting to influence youth. Surely, 
small numbers of properly selected recruiters could help open avenues in traditionally 
minority populations, thereby increasing the awareness and interest in SF.218 
                                                 
217 Peterson, The Strategic Utility of U.S. Navy SEALs, 68; other SEAL officers in class with the 
author at NPS from 2010–2011 mentioned the lack of any significant advertising or training in UW when 
they joined the Navy SEALs.  
218 Kirby et al., ―Why Don't Minorities Join Special Operations Forces?‖ 523–545.  
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F. LEADER INVOLVEMENT 
Since the operational pace within all of the SF groups is extremely high, little 
time remains for concerns apart from how to win multiple wars, as well as maintain 
continuous global engagements. However, any lapse now in quality of personnel joining 
the regiment will be felt years from now in future conflicts. Thus, a more concerted focus 
by the leadership within the Special Forces Regiment today is more critical than many 
may realize. Milton Miles, Eric Feldt, David Sterling, and Charlie Beckwith were all very 
closely involved in the recruitment process for their organizations. The same has been 
true of successful businessmen.  
When Les Wexner (owner of 3,800 stores, including The Limited, Express, 
Victoria’s Secret, and Bath & Body Works) had falling sales in the early 1990s, he 
solicited help from other business leaders he respected. His takeaway after speaking with 
them was that they spent much less time working on new products and advertising. 
Instead, they spent nearly half of their entire effort on personnel, including recruiting new 
talent. One of the CEOs Wexner spoke to said, ―having the most talented people in each 
of our businesses is the most important thing. If we don’t we lose.‖219 Microsoft’s Bill 
Gates and Jack Welch from General Electric spent fifty percent or more of their time on 
recruiting talent in the late 1990s and early 2000s.220 Arguably, SF should consider what 
it will take to compete with other organizations for the best people, especially if top 
leaders from other organizations are willing to spend so much time recruiting. If, for 
instance, SF soldiers are the best recruiting tool the regiment owns, the time is now to 
challenge and encourage them to turn every interaction into a subtle ―sell‖ for SF.  
G. CONCLUSION 
With targeted recruitment, a referral program, reorganization of the SORB under 
USASOC, accurate advertising, a long-term engagement strategy for recruitment, and 
renewed leader involvement, SF will be better positioned to recruit individuals who 
                                                 
219 Ed Michaels, Helen Handfield-Jones, and Beth Axelrod, The War for Talent (Boston: Harvard 
Business School Press, 2001), 19–20.  
220 Jeffrey E. Christian, Headhunter's Edge (New York: Random House, Inc., 2002), 13. 
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already have the traits common to talented UW operators. No matter their mission, 
whether advising local partisans in the Humyangbukdo province of North Korea, 
assisting future Guatemalan government efforts to combat transnational criminal 
organizations along their Mexican border, or advising local militias in the ongoing war in 
the Democratic Republic of the Congo, better talent can only help SF. These initiatives 
would not only draw motivated men able to adapt to changing situations and interact 
extremely well with populations across varied cultures and organizations while still 
maintaining the high standards required for completing SF training, but it would also set 
the conditions retaining them since they would know exactly the kind of work for which 
they are volunteering before ever entering SF.  
As the Army becomes smaller and more homogenous, so does the pool of active 
duty recruits joining SF. While SFAS will continue to serve the Special Force Regiment 
well by rigorously assessing the motivation and adaptability of future recruits, adding 
more SF recruiters to screen additional recruiting pools for those likely to possess 
interpersonal intelligence and cross-cultural capability will further increase the quality of 
the regiment of tomorrow. By finding these men, USASOC can provide the National 
Command Authority yet greater latitude when it comes to considering UW as a primary 
course of action for contending with future threats.  
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APPENDIX A. ACTIVE-DUTY SPECIAL FORCES DEMOGRAPHY 
The Defense Manpower Data Center (DMDC) in Seaside, CA provided the 
following data and uses data from January 2011. This appendix compares the 
demographics of active duty SF (SF) soldiers with non-SF active duty Army male 
soldiers to determine if statistically significant differences exist. The following conditions 
were used to calculate statistical significance:  
 
Test Statistic (z) =  
 
Sensitivity Level (α) = 0.01 
X  = p1 = Special Forces (SF) proportion 
Y  = p2 = Non-Special Forces (non-SF) proportion  
σ2 = (p) × (1-p)  
m = total number of active duty SF soldiers in population = 8,425 
When analyzed by individual SF MOS, the following values for m were used: 
18A = 1,665 
180A = 493 
18B = 1,227 
18C = 1,110 
18D = 1,033 
18E = 1,164 
18F = 482 
18Z = 1,251 






Null hypothesis: no difference exists between proportion of SF and non-SF 
H0: p1=p2 
Alternate Hypotheses: difference exists between proportion of SF and non-SF 
H1: p1 > p2 and z value is greater than 2.576 (>2.576): 
 SF proportion statistically greater than non-SF proportion 
H2: p1 < p2 and z value is less than -2.576 (<-2.576) 
 SF proportion statistically less than non-SF proportion 
Therefore, if the z value falls in the rejection region (>2.576 and -2.576>), one rejects the 
null hypothesis (that the proportions are not different) and accepts one of the alternate 
hypotheses, H1 or H2. If the z value for p1 is greater than 2.576 (>2.576), p1 is considered 
statistically significant and greater than p2. If the z value for p1 is less than -2.576 (<-
2.576), p1 is considered statistically significant and smaller than p2. If the z value falls 
outside of the rejection region, (<2.576 and -2.576>), the two proportions are not 
statistically different.  
A. AGE 
Table 2 highlights the age breakdown of the active duty SF population when 
compared to the non-SF active duty Army. Expectedly, the SF proportion of older 
soldiers is greater than the proportion for non-SF. For example, the proportion of 41–45 
years-old 18As (p=0.189) is much greater than the proportion of non-SF 41–45 years-old 
soldiers (p=0.064). The 18A proportion is statistically greater because the test statistic, z, 
has a value of 29.174, which falls in the rejection region (>2.576 and -2.576>). Similarly, 
the proportion of 180As between 26–30 years-old (p=0.008) produced a z value of -54.90 
when compared to the non-SF proportion of 26–30 year-olds (p=0.232), falling in the 





Table 2.   Proportion (p) of active duty SF soldiers by Age Group statistically 
compared to the proportion of non-SF male soldiers. 
z values test for significance (boldface z values indicate statistical significance) at a 
sensitivity level (α) of 0.01. Of note, 18–20 year-old data was recorded but not displayed 
because only one SF soldier was in the 18–20 year-old Age-Group.  
 
 




Table 3 highlights the enlisted rank/grade proportions of active duty SF and non-
SF Army male soldiers. The SF proportion of senior ranks (E–6 and E–7) is greater than 
the proportion for non-SF. For example, the proportion of 18C E-7s (p=0.473) is much 
greater than the proportion of non-SF E-7s (p=0.116). 18Cs are statistically much greater 
because the test statistic, z, has a value of 25.812, which falls in the rejection region 
(>2.576 and -2.576>). Likewise, the proportion of 18B E-4s (p=0.013) produced a z 
value of -126.974, which when compared to the non-SF E-4s (p=0.434), it falls in the 
rejection region (>2.576 and -2.576>), indicating the SF proportion is much less than the 
non-SF proportion.  
Table 3.   Proportion (p) of active duty enlisted SF soldiers by grade (E–4 to E–7) 
statistically compared to the proportion of enlisted non-SF male.  
z values test for significance (all values significance) at a sensitivity level (α) of 0.01. Of 




Figure 8.   Comparison by enlisted grade (E–4 to E–7) of active duty SF and non-SF 
male soldiers.  
C. RACE AND ETHNICITY 
Table 4 highlights the proportions of different races within the active duty SF 
when compared to the proportion of non-SF Army male soldiers. Of significance, the 
proportion of Black SF soldiers (p=0.046) and Asian (p=0.021) are much smaller than the 
comparable non-SF proportion for Blacks (p=0.180) and Asian (p=0.037). The z values 
for SF soldiers who are Black (-57.136) or Asian (-9.700) are much less than (-2.576), 
indicating a statistically significant lower number of SF soldiers are Black or Asian than 
the non-SF population. In contrast, the proportion of white soldiers is significantly higher 
in SF (p=0.845) than the proportion for non-SF (p=0.722). This result is statistical 
significance because the test statistic, z, has a value of 30.621, which falls in the rejection 
region (>2.576 and -2.576>). All proportions of American Indian or Native Alaskans 
within SF were not statically significant because their z values fell outside of the rejection 
region (<2.576 and -2.576<).  
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Table 4.   Proportion (p) of active duty SF soldiers by race compared to the proportion 
of non-SF soldiers.  
Comparisons produced z values to test for significance (boldface z values indicate 
statistical significance) at a sensitivity level (α) of 0.01.  
 
 
Figure 9.   Comparison of White active duty SF and non-SF male soldiers.  
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Figure 10.   Comparison of Black active duty SF and non-SF male soldiers.  
 
Figure 11.   Comparison of Asian SF and non-SF soldiers.  
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Figure 12.   Comparison of American Indian/Native Alaskan active duty SF and non-SF 
male soldiers.  
Table 5 highlights the proportions of Hispanics within the active duty SF 
population when compared to non-SF active duty Army male soldiers. Of significance, 
the proportion of Hispanic 18As (p=0.041) and 18Z (p=0.058) are much smaller than the 
comparable non-SF proportion for Hispanics (p=0.112). The z value for 18A (-13.813) or 
18Z (-8.039) is in the rejection region (>2.576 and -2.576>), indicating a statistically 
significant lower number of 18As and 18Zs are Hispanic than the non-SF population. In 
contrast, the proportion of Hispanic 18F (p=0.122) is slightly larger than non-SF 
(p=0.112), although not statistically significant because the test statistic vale is (0.713), 
which lies outside the rejection region (<2.576 and -2.576<). Additionally, the proportion 
of Hispanic 18B (p=0.102) was also not statistically significant, with a z value of (-1.143) 




Table 5.   Proportion (p) of Hispanic active duty SF soldiers statistically compared to 
the proportion of non-SF soldiers.  
z values test for significance (boldface z values indicate statistical significance) at a 
sensitivity level (α) of 0.01.  
 
 
Figure 13.   Comparison of Hispanic active duty SF and non-SF male soldiers.  
 86 
D. EDUCATION 
Table 6 compares the highest level of education achieved by active duty SF with 
non-SF active duty Army male soldiers. Expectedly, the SF proportion of soldiers with 
undergraduate degrees (p=0.224) is greater than the proportion for non-SF (p=0.113). 
This difference is statistically significant because the z value of (24.356) falls in the 
rejection region (>2.576 and -2.576>). The proportion of 18As with Master’s degrees 
(p=0.354) is also much greater than the proportion of non-SF (p=0.116) and is 
statistically significant due to a z value of (25.397). In contrast, the proportion of SF 
soldiers with Doctorate degrees (p=0.001) is statistically less than the non-SF proportion 
(p=0.056) due to the z value of (-4.792), which falls outside of the rejection region 
(<2.576 and -2.576<).  
Table 6.   Proportion (p) of active duty SF soldiers by highest education level achieved 
compared to the proportion of non-SF.  
z values test for significance (boldface z values indicate statistical significance) at a 




Figure 14.   Comparison of highest level of education achieved of active duty SF and 
non-SF male soldiers. 
E. MARITAL STATUS AND NUMBER OF DEPENDENTS 
Table 7 compares the proportions of various marital statuses of active duty SF and 
non-SF male soldiers. Of significance, the proportion of SF soldiers that are married 
(p=0.736) and never married (p=0.199) are much different from the non-SF proportion 
for married (p=0.603) and never married (p=0.350). The z for married and never married 
SF soldiers were (27.376) and (-34.314), which both fall in the rejection region (>2.576 
and -2.576>). Thus, a statistically significant greater number of SF soldiers are married 
while a statistically significant lower number of SF soldiers have never been married. 
Also, the proportion of currently divorced soldiers is greater in SF (p=0.061) than the 
proportion for non-SF (p=0.045). This result is also statistical significance because z has 




Table 7.   Proportion (p) of active duty SF soldiers by marital status compared to the 
proportion of non-SF soldiers.  
z values test for significance (boldface z values indicate statistical significance) at a 
sensitivity level (α) of 0.01.  
 
 
Figure 15.   Comparison of currently married active duty SF and non-SF male soldiers. 
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Figure 16.   Comparison of currently divorced active duty SF and non-SF male soldiers. 
 
Figure 17.   Comparison of never married active duty SF and non-SF male soldiers. 
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Table 8 compares the number of dependents of active duty SF and non-SF male 
soldiers. Of significance, the proportion of SF soldiers with three dependents (p=0.238) 
and four dependents (p=0.118) are greater than the non-SF proportion for three 
dependents (p=0.170) and four dependents (p=0.093). These produced z values of 
(14.657) for SF with three dependents and (7.026) for SF with four dependents, which 
both fall in the rejection region (>2.576 and -2.576>), indicating statistically significant 
differences exist between SF and non-SF proportions.  
Table 8.   Proportion (p) of the number of dependents for active duty SF and non-SF 
male soldiers.  
z values test for significance (boldface z values indicate statistical significance) at a 





Figure 18.   Comparison of the number of dependents of active duty SF and non-SF 
male soldiers. 
F. COUNTRY OF BIRTH 
Table 9 highlights the number of foreign-born soldiers in the SF population when 
compared to the rest of the active duty Army. The proportion of U.S.-born soldiers is 
slightly higher in SF (p=0.954) than the proportion for non-SF (p=0.948), but is not 
statistically significant since test statistic, z, has a value of 2.467, which falls outside the 
rejection region (<2.576 and -2.576<). Of significance, the proportion of SF born in 
Africa (p=0.0004) and South America (p=0.0002) is lower than the comparable non-SF 
proportion for soldier born in Africa (p=0.001) and South America (p=0.001). The z 
values for SF born in Africa -4.536 and South America -3.829 is less than -2.576, 
indicating a statistically significant lower number of SF soldiers are foreign born in 
Africa and South America than the non-SF population. In contrast, the proportion of SF 
soldiers born in Europe (p=0.008) is greater than the proportion of non-SF born in Europe 
(p=0.005) with a z value of 3.537, indicating a statistically significant larger number of 
SF soldiers are born in Europe than non-SF.  
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Table 9.   Proportion (p) of active duty SF soldiers born outside of the U.S. by world 
region statistically compared to the proportion of non-SF soldiers.  
z values test for significance (boldface values indicate statistical significance) at a 
sensitivity level (α) of 0.01. U.S.-born proportions also included for comparison.  
 
 
Figure 19.   Comparison of foreign-born active duty SF and non-SF male soldiers. 
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G. U.S. REGIONAL DISTRIBUTION 
Table 10 highlights the state residency of the active duty SF population. 
Expectedly, the SF proportion is high (p=0.485) in the Southeast and the test statistic, z, 
has a value of 41.287, which lies in the rejection region (>2.576 and -2.576>). Thus, SF 
state residency is statistically much greater in the Southeast when compared to the rest of 
the active duty Army. In contrast, SF has a z value of -25.484 for the Midwest, indicating 
a statistically significant lower number of Midwest residents when compared to the non-
SF population.  
U.S. states were divided into different regions for this analysis: Northwest=AK, 
WA, OR, ID, MT, WY; West=HI, CA, NV; Southwest=AZ, UT, CO, NM, TX, OK, AR, 
LA; Southeast=MS, AL, TN, KY, NC, SC, GA, FL, PR; Midwest=ND, SD, NE, KS, 
MN, IA, MO, WI, IL, IN, OH, MI; Mid-Atlantic=WV, VA, PA, MD, DE, NJ, DC; 
Northeast=NY, VT, NH, ME, MA, RI, CT; Other=U.S. provinces outside of fifty states.  
Table 10.   Proportion (p) of active duty SF soldiers by U.S. region compared to non-SF 
male soldiers.  
z values test for significance (boldface values indicate statistical significance) at a 
sensitivity level (α) of 0.01. Of note, 0.013 of non-SF reported ―unknown‖ for residency 














Figure 20.   Comparison of U.S. residency of active duty SF and non-SF male soldiers. 
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APPENDIX B. NATIONAL GUARD SPECIAL FORCES 
DEMOGRAPHY 
Defense Manpower Data Center (DMDC) in Seaside, CA provided the following 
data and uses data from January 2011. This appendix compares the demographics of 
National Guard (NG) Special Forces (SF) soldiers with the remaining Army National 
Guard male soldiers to determine if any statistically significant differences exist. The 
following conditions were used to calculate statistical significance:  
 
Test Statistic (z) =  
 
Sensitivity Level (α) = 0.01 
X  = p1 = National Guard Special Forces (SF) proportion 
Y  = p2 = Non-Special Forces (non-SF) proportion  
σ2 = (p) × (1-p)  
m = total number of National Guard Special Forces soldiers in population = 1,627 
When analyzed by individual SF MOS, the following values for m were used: 
18A = 257 
180A = 89 
18B = 236 
18C = 234 
18D = 230 
18E = 251 
 






18Z = 244 
n = number of Non-SF Army National Guard male soldiers = 313,641 
Null hypothesis: no difference between proportions of SF and non-SF 
H0: p1=p2 
Alternate Hypotheses: difference exists between proportions of SF and non-SF 
H1: p1 > p2 and z value is greater than 2.576 (>2.576): 
 NG SF proportion statistically greater than non-SF NG proportion 
H2: p1 < p2 and z value is less than -2.576 (<-2.576): 
 NG SF population statistically less than non-SF NG population 
Therefore, if the z value falls in the rejection region (>2.576 and -2.576>), one rejects the 
null hypothesis (that the proportions are not different) and accept one of the alternate 
hypotheses, H1 or H2. If the z value for p1 is greater than 2.576 (>2.576), p1 is considered 
statistically significant and greater than p2. If the z value for p1 is less than -2.576 (<-
2.576), p1 is considered statistically significant and smaller than p2. If the z value falls 
outside of the rejection region, (>2.576 and -2.576<), the two proportions are not 
statistically different.  
A. AGE 
Table 11 highlights the age group breakdown between the National Guard SF and 
non-SF male soldiers. Expectedly, the SF proportion of older soldiers is greater than the 
proportion for non-SF. For example, the proportion of 46–50 years-olds in SF (p=0.125) 
is much greater than the proportion of non-SF 46–50 year-olds (p=0.041). This 
proportion is statistically greater because the test statistic, z, has a value of 7.710, which 
falls in the rejection region (>2.576 and -2.576>). Similarly, the proportion of SF 31–35 
year-olds (p=0.222) produced a z value of 10.021 when compared to the non-SF 




Table 11.   Proportion (p) by Age Group of National Guard SF and non-SF soldiers.  
z values test for significance (boldface z values indicate statistical significance) at a 
sensitivity level (α) of 0.01. Of note, 18–20 year old data was recorded but was not 
displayed since only one SF soldier was in the 18–20 age group.  
Age
Non-SF 
p z p z p z p z p z p z p z
SF (Total) 0.043 -43.190 0.179 -0.759 0.222 10.021 0.184 7.521 0.170 8.088 0.125 7.710 0.076 5.338
18A 0.000 -334.487 0.043 -11.381 0.187 2.808 0.195 22.606 0.189 29.174 0.077 18.435 0.025 9.988
180A 0.000 -334.487 0.022 -10.444 0.101 -0.543 0.258 3.167 0.326 4.651 0.180 2.893 0.112 2.145
18B 0.076 -10.792 0.288 3.439 0.237 4.289 0.140 1.257 0.097 0.139 0.085 1.254 0.072 1.870
18C 0.107 -7.724 0.308 4.009 0.239 4.331 0.158 1.957 0.090 -0.269 0.060 -0.140 0.038 -0.167
18D 0.052 -14.352 0.230 1.574 0.239 7.301 0.243 4.665 0.061 -2.149 0.048 -1.007 0.017 -2.686
18E 0.060 -13.560 0.116 4.001 0.311 6.581 0.135 1.112 0.104 0.458 0.048 -1.053 0.040 -0.058
18F 0.000 -13.560 0.116 -2.037 0.256 2.919 0.198 2.008 0.221 2.820 0.140 2.075 0.070 1.063
18Z 0.000 -334.487 0.000 -268.338 0.049 -5.002 0.201 3.484 0.320 7.532 0.262 7.112 0.168 5.325
Over 50
0.263 0.187 0.118 0.111 0.095 0.062 0.041
21-25 26-30 31-35 36-40 41-45 46-50
 
 
Figure 21.   Comparison by Age Group of National Guard SF and non-SF male soldiers.  
B. RANK/GRADE 
Table 12 highlights the difference in rank/grade between National Guard SF and 
non-SF male soldiers. Expectedly, SF has a greater proportion of more senior ranks (E–6 
and E–7) than the proportion for non-SF. For example, the proportion of SF E–7s 
(p=0.471) is much greater than the proportion of non-SF E–7s (p=0.094). The greater 
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number of E–7s in SF display statistically significance because the test statistic, z, has a 
value of 24.298, which falls in the rejection region (>2.576 and -2.576>). In contrast, the 
proportion of 18B E–5s (p=0.077) produced a z value of -12.363 when compared to the 
non-SF E–4s (p=0.291), falling in the rejection region (>2.576 and -2.576>). 
Table 12.   Proportion (p) of enlisted National Guard SF soldiers by grade compared to 
the proportion of enlisted non-SF soldiers.  
z values test for significance (all values significance) at a sensitivity level (α) of 0.01. Of 
note, 18F had no soldiers below the grade of E–7.  
Rank
Non-SF 
p z p z p z p z
SF (Total) 0.000 -429.707 0.056 -32.674 0.473 19.400 0.471 24.298
18B 0.013 -57.628 0.077 -12.363 0.426 7.873 0.011 12.011
18C 0.026 -39.776 0.079 -11.977 0.422 7.721 0.473 11.619
18D 0.026 -39.428 0.091 -10.539 0.411 7.367 0.471 11.475
18E 0.023 -43.918 0.093 -10.816 0.416 7.825 0.468 11.889
18F 0.000 -429.707 0.000 -308.827 0.000 -219.877 1.000 1498.915
E-4 E-5 E-6 E-7




Figure 22.   Comparison by enlisted grade (E4–E7) of National Guard SF and non-SF 
male soldiers.  
C. RACE AND ETHNICITY 
Table 13 highlights the proportions of different races within the National Guard 
SF population when compared to the non-SF Army National Guard. Of significance, the 
proportion of Black SF soldiers (p=0.028) is much smaller than the comparable non-SF 
proportion for Blacks (p=0.115). The z values for Black SF soldiers (-21.192) lies far 
inside the rejection region (>2.576 and -2.576>), indicating a statistically significant 
lower number of SF soldiers are Black than the non-SF population. In contrast, the 
proportion of white soldiers is significantly higher in SF (p=0.921) than the proportion 
for non-SF (p=0.823). This result is statistical significance because the test statistic, z, has 
a value of 14.631, which falls in the rejection region (>2.576 and -2.576>). All 
proportions of Asians and American Indians/Native Alaskans within SF were not 
statically different from the non-SF population because their z values fell outside of the 
rejection region (<2.576 and -2.576<).  
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Table 13.   Proportion (p) of National Guard SF soldiers by race statistically compared 
to the proportion of non-SF soldiers.  
z values test for significance (boldface z values indicate statistical significance) at a 
sensitivity level (α) of 0.01.  
 
 
Figure 23.   Comparison of White National Guard SF and non-SF male soldiers.  
 101 
 
Figure 24.   Comparison of Black National Guard SF and non-SF male soldiers.  
 
Figure 25.   Comparison of Asian National Guard SF and non-SF male soldiers.  
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Figure 26.   Comparison of American Indian / Native Alaskan National Guard SF and 
non-SF male soldiers.  
Table 14 highlights the proportions of Hispanics in the National Guard SF when 
compared to the non-SF Army National Guard. Of significance, the proportion of 
Hispanic 18As (p=0.019) and 18Ds (p=0.022) are much smaller than the comparable 
non-SF proportion for Hispanics (p=0.081). The z value for 18A (-10.691) or 18D  
(-9.346) fall far inside the rejection region (>2.576 and -2.576>), indicating a statistically 
significant lower number of 18As and 18Ds are Hispanic than the non-SF population. In 
contrast, the proportion of Hispanic 180A (p=0.034) is less than the non-SF population 
(p=0.081) but is not statistically significant because the test statistic value (-2.028) lies 






Table 14.   Proportion (p) of Hispanic National Guard SF soldiers compared to the 
proportion of non-SF soldiers.  
z values test for significance (boldface z values indicate statistical significance) at a 

















Figure 27.   Comparison of Hispanic National Guard SF and non-SF male soldiers.  
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D. EDUCATION 
Table 15 compares the highest level of education achieved by the National Guard 
SF population with the non-SF Army National Guard population. Expectedly, the SF 
proportion of soldiers with undergraduate degrees (p=0.291) is greater than the 
proportion for non-SF (p=0.122). This difference is statistically significant because the z 
value of (15.004) falls in the rejection region (>2.576 and -2.576>). The proportion of 
18As with Master’s degrees (p=0.237) is also much greater than the proportion of non-SF 
(p=0.024) and is statistically significant due to a z value of (8.027). In contrast, the 
proportion of SF soldiers with Doctorate degrees (p=0.005) is less than the non-SF 
proportion (p=0.003), but is not statistically significant because the z value of (0.993) lies 
outside of the rejection region (<2.576 and -2.576<).  
Table 15.   Proportion (p) of National Guard SF soldiers by highest education level 
achieved compared to the proportion of non-SF soldiers. 
z values test for significance (boldface z values indicate statistical significance) at a 




Figure 28.   Comparison of highest level of education achieved by National Guard SF 
and non-SF male soldiers. 
E. MARITAL STATUS AND NUMBER OF DEPENDENTS 
Table 16 compares the proportions of different marital statuses of the National 
Guard SF population with the non-SF Army National Guard. Of significance, the 
proportion of SF soldiers that are married (p=0.668) and never married (p=0.250) are 
much different from the non-SF proportion for married (p=0.466) and never married 
(p=0.475). The z value for married and never married SF soldiers is (17.272) and (-
20.979), which both fall inside the rejection region (>2.576 and -2.576>). Thus, a 
statistically significant greater number of SF soldiers are married while a statistically 
significant lower number of SF soldiers have never been married than the non-SF Army 
National Guard. Also, the proportion of currently divorced soldiers is greater in SF 
(p=0.078) than the proportion for non-SF (p=0.057). This result is also statistical 
significance because z has a value of (3.167), which also falls inside the rejection region 
(>2.576 and -2.576>).  
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Table 16.   Proportion (p) of National Guard SF soldiers by marital status compared to 
the proportion of non-SF soldiers.  
z values test for significance (boldface z values indicate statistical significance) at a 
sensitivity level (α) of 0.01.  
Marital Status
Non-SF 
p z p z p z p z p z p z p z
SF (Total) 0.0012 0.882 0.078 3.167 0.000 -2.828 0.001 0.750 0.668 17.272 0.250 -20.979 0.002 1.064
18A 0.000 -12.044 0.109 2.675 0.000 -2.828 0.004 0.853 0.767 11.387 0.121 -17.446 0.000 -14.938
180A 0.000 -12.044 0.034 -1.215 0.000 -2.828 0.011 0.954 0.865 11.026 0.079 -13.897 0.011 0.942
18B 0.000 -12.044 0.059 0.154 0.000 -2.828 0.000 -13.458 0.593 3.981 0.347 -4.126 0.000 -14.938
18C 0.000 -12.044 0.090 1.754 0.000 -2.828 0.000 -13.458 0.543 2.359 0.363 -3.565 0.004 0.835
18D 0.004 0.896 0.057 -0.029 0.000 -2.828 0.000 -13.458 0.652 5.930 0.287 -6.315 0.000 -14.938
18E 0.004 0.886 0.056 -0.081 0.000 -2.828 0.000 -13.458 0.562 3.060 0.378 -3.164 0.000 -14.938
18F 0.004 0.886 0.116 -0.081 0.000 -2.828 0.000 -13.458 0.686 4.399 0.198 -6.466 0.000 -14.938
18Z 0.000 -12.044 0.098 2.171 0.000 -2.828 0.000 -13.458 0.803 13.250 0.094 -20.352 0.004 0.828
Widowed
0.0005 0.057 0.00003 0.001 0.466 0.475 0.001
Annulled Divorced Interlocutory Legally Seperated Married Never Married
 
 






















Figure 31.   Comparison of never married National Guard SF and non-SF male soldiers. 
Table 17 compares the number of dependents for the National Guard SF with the 
non-SF Army National Guard. Of significance, the proportion of SF soldiers with two 
dependents (p=0.165) and three dependents (p=0.150) are greater than the non-SF 
proportion for two dependents (p=0.122) and three dependents (p=0.117). This produced 
z values of (4.706) for SF with two dependents and (3.749) for SF with three dependents, 
which both fall inside the rejection region (>2.576 and -2.576>), indicating statistically 







Table 17.   Proportion (p) of National Guard SF soldiers by the number of dependents 
compared to the proportion of non-SF. 
 z values test for significance (boldface z values indicate statistical significance) at a 
sensitivity level (α) of 0.01.  
 
 
Figure 32.   Comparison of the number of dependents of National Guard SF and non-SF 
male soldiers. 
F. U.S. REGIONAL DISTRIBUTION 
Table 18 highlights the state residency of the National Guard SF population. 
Expectedly, the SF proportion is high (p=0.296) in the Southeast and the test statistic, z, 
has a value of 6.585, which lies in the rejection region (>2.576 and -2.576>). Thus, SF 
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state residency is statistically much greater in the Southeast when compared to the rest of 
the Army National Guard. In contrast, the proportion of SF with residency in the Midwest 
(p=0.095) produced a z value of -22.579 for the Midwest, indicating a statistically 
significant lower number of Midwest residents are in SF when compared to the non-SF 
population (p=0.261).  
The U.S. states were divided into different regions for this analysis: 
Northwest=AK, WA, OR, ID, MT, WY; West=HI, CA, NV; Southwest=AZ, UT, CO, 
NM, TX, OK, AR, LA; Southeast=MS, AL, TN, KY, NC, SC, GA, FL, PR; 
Midwest=ND, SD, NE, KS, MN, IA, MO, WI, IL, IN, OH, MI; Mid-Atlantic=WV, VA, 
PA, MD, DE, NJ, DC; Northeast=NY, VT, NH, ME, MA, RI, CT; Other=U.S. provinces 
outside of fifty states.  
Table 18.   Proportion (p) of SF soldiers by U.S. region statistically compared to the 
proportion of non-SF soldiers.  
Comparisons produced z values to test for significance (boldface values indicate 
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